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ABSTRACT 
 
Morales, Monica D. M.A. Department of Political Science, International and 
Comparative Politics Program, Wright State University, 2015. A Multi-Disciplinary 
Analysis of Web 2.0 Technology Use in Egypt & China, 2005-2010. 
 
 
Taking a cue from scholars’ suggestions to focus on the intersections of various fields of 
study, this research aims to find the commonalities among representative theories of 
democracy, mass media and social movements. Assessment of each reveals that all three 
areas of study encompass space for the interface of the media and the public. The 
confluence of these elements, when paired with Information and Communication-based 
technologies, yields what is introduced here as the Integrative Conceptual Model of 
Internet Analysis. Using this model gives way to a focus on Internet-mediated scenarios 
through a framework that evaluates the type of agent interaction, network formation, 
agents’ dialogue and the incident’s outcome. This is applied to three incidents in both the 
People’s Republic of China and Egypt from 2005 to 2010. The interplay between media 
and citizens is explained through overarching messages, and interactions that may 
undergird the networks that mobilize collective action.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As the Arab Spring unfolded in late 2010, its citizen protests and uprisings 
highlighted the potential influence and roles information and communication-based 
technologies, or ICTs, could play in prompting regime change. In subsequent years, 
scholarly exploration has centered on the debate surrounding Internet technologies as 
tools of democratization or advanced communication. Instead of continuing this debate, 
this research aims to unify Web technologies’ similarities in the context of three different 
fields of study: democracy, communication and social movements. The present body of 
academic discussion about the Internet and ICTs remains largely stove-piped, focusing on 
theoretical frameworks constrained to a single discipline and logical short-term findings. 
While this narrow exploration is somewhat expected given the Internet’s relatively short 
history, it also overlooks long-term effects and over-arching theoretical implications. 
Broader analysis also bears the challenge of being driven by world events. Chief among 
the questions in my research is, “How do theoretical models of various fields of study 
converge to enhance understanding of Web 2.0 technologies’ roles and functions as 
different agents interact?” The analysis drawn from exploring this research question also 
aims to determine how the United States may best approach crafting foreign policy as it 
relates to protecting Internet freedoms around the globe.   
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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The proliferation of ICT use and its inherent ability to serve as a platform for 
public opinion had not previously gone unnoticed by governments, especially 
authoritarian regimes sensitive to scrutiny and criticism. Just months before the Arab 
Spring’s beginning in late 2010, the Chinese Communist Party revised the Law on 
Guarding State Secrets to include more controlof content that might eventually make its 
way online. The amended law brought heightened accountability to the country’s Internet 
companies and telecommunications operators, essentially relying on them to censor at the 
source and in compliance with Chinese authority (Xu). One month later in May 2010, the 
Chinese government released its first white paper on the Internet. This document called 
for all Internet users in the country, even foreign organizations and individuals, to abide 
by specified laws and regulations in efforts to maintain Chinese “Internet sovereignty” 
(Xu). The release of these governmental provisions brought to a fore years of Chinese 
authorities’ desire to further implement controls over citizens’ Internet use. The Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) had already experienced much discomfort in 2009 over the 
prospect of online chatter generated by the simultaneous anniversaries of Tiananmen 
Square, the Dalai Lama’s exile and the banning of the Falun Gong (Deibert et al. 452), 
and it responded accordingly by blocking sites that might incite social unrest (Xu).  
In December 2010, citizen unrest in Tunisia reached its crescendo and began 
sweeping across the Middle East region. This domino effect showcased a newer 
dimension of social organizing, prompting the question of how ICTs managed to gain a 
foothold in attempted political transitions. The answer to this question may ultimately 
contribute to the foundation of a strategic roadmap for U.S. foreign policy related to the 
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Internet and its accompanying technologies – another area under-represented in current 
academic research.  Thus, this research may additionally provide policy makers with 
indicators capable of influencing institutional outcomes. 
What transpired in Egypt in January 2011 underscores the significance of 
contributions to this type of research. Amid the voices of thousands of citizens gathered 
in Tahrir Square to protest against their government, Egyptian officials unilaterally 
decided to sever the nation’s Internet connectivity just minutes after midnight on January 
28. This act left the world with a sobering impression of the duality of technology, both 
in its capacity to embolden a nation’s repressive will and empower citizens’ rights. Just 
four days prior, the Web served a multitude of functions for Egyptian citizenry – hosting 
up-to-the-minute developments of unrest on journalists’ blogs, serving as a venue for 
activists’ plans on social media sites, and, more generally, acting as a reporting platform 
for sharing citizens’ Tweets and videos with the world. As readily as citizens shared this 
information, access to it was seized within moments – almost the entire population of 
Egypt was without Internet connectivity, cell phone service and television signals.  
Five days later, Internet access was restored and, within weeks, Egypt’s 
authoritarian ruler stepped down. Witnessing this transition of power alongside the use of 
technology as an overt enabler to political discourse broke new ground and ushered forth 
much inquiry. At its most basic, it shed light on the ongoing struggle for human rights. 
Continued developments stemming from the Arab Spring, an ongoing series of anti-
government demonstration and protest incited throughout the region, revealed Internet 
technologies’ pivotal role in citizen organizing and the accompanying trend of a 
government’s swift response to stop it. After Egypt’s Internet shutdown, other regimes 
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followed suit: Syria’s regime disconnected the Internet nationwide on June 3, 2011, as 
protestors called for the resignation of their president (Flock); the Libyan government 
shutdown the country’s Internet on February 18, 2011, amid widespread protests 
(Huffington Post); and during this same time period, the Committee to Protect Journalists 
reported that Internet users in Bahrain and Yemen experienced slowed or weakened 
online connectivity.  
Just as these events quickly reshaped the global political landscape, so too did 
users follow in lock-step to adapt Internet technologies to meet their own needs. This 
rapid progression yields fluid meanings, specifically in the case of software platforms 
that, like any innovation, “may be designed for specific purposes but often end up having 
wildly different social uses and effects than those intended by their creators” (Deibert 
44).  
Two key definitions are outlined here to reflect a distinction otherwise perceived 
as a seamless technological overlap. First, before a communication technology transitions 
to the online realm it first draws its power from the Internet, defined simply by Boas and 
Kalathil as a “set of protocols allowing computers to exchange information” (2). Thus the 
Internet, in its technological form, includes components of both hardware and software 
(McCarthy 91).  
Second, ICTs, also known as Web 2.0 technologies, are any format by which 
political, social and economic discourse can flourish. In the digital age, this translates 
technologically into devices like “the mobile phone, and countless innovative 
applications for them, including ‘new social media’ such as Facebook and Twitter” 
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(Diamond 70). This subject garners most of its attention based on how people develop 
uses for these software applications, for example, to communicate news of civil unrest 
instantaneously with the world. As previously mentioned, the Internet merely enables 
these exchanges, albeit through a vehicle with diverse reach and immediacy. Hence the 
advent of Internet-enabled cell phones, short message services, Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube has become the dominant form of interactivity today, where once message 
boards and e-mail served similar communication purposes during the Internet’s infancy. 
As stated, the bulk of the academic literature attempts to answer questions 
generally pertaining to what roles Web 2.0 technologies play in influencing state and 
society. While this body of work primarily represents the nexus of political science, 
scholars of communication and mass media, sociology and law have also weighed in to 
“fill the blanks” created by these technologies. The resulting literature proposes the 
following concentrations of study: Web 2.0 contributions to the public sphere; democratic 
models as they relate to Internet-democracy research; and, criticisms of the Internet as a 
catalyst of political influence and change.  
EXPECTED FINDINGS AND FURTHER RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research focuses on the integration of several fields of study to build a 
working conceptual framework for case analysis. Thus, areas of integrated common 
ground largely still remain to be discovered. Initial expected findings resulting from this 
research include the following: 
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The intersection of various sub-fields of study – to include democratization, media 
and social movements – will reveal the types of interactivity that occur between 
mass media, citizen publics and the state as mediated via Web 2.0 technologies.  
By extension, strong working relationships between state-run media organizations 
and independent citizen “reporters” have the potential to pose a greater threat to 
state institutions. 
For purposes of this research, it is important to define here that media and media 
organizations refer to primarily state-owned media outlets that produce more traditional 
news products, to include newspapers, news magazines and their digital counterparts, 
crafted by professional journalists (Tang and Sampson 460). This distinction is critical 
given that citizen publics, or netizens, can create non-traditional online news “outlets” of 
their own wherever public commentary is posted. These venues may be independent of 
those that are state-run, yet bring with them an equal, if not greater, ability to generate 
news and attention. While these expected findings attempt to synthesize various 
theoretical frameworks, they also seek potentially to answer further questions such as: 
1. Have Web 2.0 technologies influenced mass media reporting in authoritarian 
regimes?  
2. Does the type of relationship fostered between mass media and citizen publics 
affect state behavior? 
3. How do theoretical models of varying fields of study work together to 
enhance understanding of Web 2.0 technologies’ roles and functions? 
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4. More broadly, how should the United States respond – and what might it 
avoid – assuming that the nation is to craft foreign policy rooted in protecting 
freedom and universal human rights?  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 An ongoing examination of the literature surrounding the Internet and Web 2.0 
technologies reveals a focus on three different core concepts. One segment of scholarship 
focuses on democratic models and their relation to Internet-democracy research. 
Similarly, another group of academics hones in on Web 2.0 technologies’ development of 
the public sphere. At the opposite end of this spectrum are those scholars who deem the 
Internet a mere communication tool – one not necessarily capable of enacting political 
influence. The following pages highlight the most significant and relevant portions of 
these over-arching areas, while also reflecting a point of departure for much needed 
additional research. 
THE INTERNET AND DEMOCRATIC MODELS 
Questioning the democratizing influence of Web 2.0 technologies is foremost 
among the scholarly discussion stemming from the Internet’s presence in contemporary 
society. Linking these technologies to applicable rhetorical practices, Dahlberg examines 
Internet-democracy theories and divides them into three broad categories – liberal 
individualist, communitarian and deliberative (158). According to him, these three 
electronic democracy camps are “distinguished by their respective understandings of 
democratic legitimacy” (Dahlberg 158). He describes each of the following models as 
follows: 
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For liberal individualism, a democratic model gains legitimacy when it 
provides for the expression of individual interests. For communitarianism, 
a democratic model is legitimated by enhancement of communal spirit and 
values. For deliberative democracy, a democratic model is legitimated by 
its facilitation of rational discourse in the public sphere (Dahlberg 158).   
    
The latter two models, communitarian and deliberative, will be described in further 
detail. 
Dahlberg’s communitarian model demonstrates individual freedom through the 
shared value brought upon by the community (164). In this view, relationships are 
molded based on structures and social roles. According to Dahlberg, “Democratic 
dialogue serves the common life of the group, rather than the interests of a private 
individual” and “enables members of a community to discover their shared identity and 
purpose” (164). Interactive media fit perfectly into this category, especially where social 
activism and communitarian objectives are the concentrated goal. Benson explains this 
media role in much the same way, but calls it instead the elitist democratic model because 
the media retain the role of a watchdog, ensuring that “corruption or incompetence” is 
closely monitored for the benefit of public good (194). Building on his definition of 
democracy, Groshek equates this with “checks and balances” where the misuse of power 
by a branch of government can be reined in by other entities (120).  
 Dahlberg’s final look at Internet-democratic research yields the deliberative 
model, a model that according to him has the capacity to build an added space where the 
exchange of ideas can take place (166). This differs from liberal individualism by 
demanding more democratic interaction via expanded networks, and from the 
communitarian model by helping participants move toward a common understanding and 
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beyond differences (Dahlberg 167). In relation to journalism and the media, Benson 
equates this to his version of the deliberative democratic model, and how the media work 
side by side with the public, creating an “environment of supportive reflection and 
providing aid in policy decisions” (194). Groshek similarly makes that case in outlining 
civil liberties within the definition of democracy. According to Groshek, civil liberties 
refer to “the guarantees of freedom citizens have in their lives and [their] acts of political 
participation” (117). 
STRENGTHENING THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 In an article written after outlining these three Internet-democratic models, 
Dahlberg analyzes the deliberative public sphere conception, often used by Internet 
researchers and commentators, to explain whether it can provide a strong foundation for 
democracy. Dahlberg then introduces to the deliberative model a new “agonistic” 
dimension that yields the radicalized public sphere conception. 
 How does this model relate to the Internet and its accompanying capabilities in 
order to build a strong model of democracy? According to Dahlberg and public sphere 
advocates, this view is 
interested in the extent and quality of argumentation being facilitated online, 
particularly given claims that the Internet’s two-way, relatively low cost, semi-
decentralized and global communications, combined with evolving interactive 
software and moderation techniques, offer the ideal basis (particularly when 
compared to the mass media) for rational deliberation (49). 
 
Central to this modified conception is the role of “counter publics,” which further 
contribute to the dialogue already taking place in the public sphere (Dahlberg 60). This 
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transforms it into a fabric of many threads – including multiple publics, each trying to 
drive its own agenda.  
Though on different terms, Zheng very similarly lays out this approach as part of 
the public sphere and public space conceptual framework for his book about technology’s 
role in China. Rejecting the notion that either the state or society benefit from the 
interaction created by the Internet (Zheng 10), he contends that Web 2.0 use is not a “zero 
sum game” and instead serves as a venue for the expansion of each actor’s political 
views. Within this broad area of study, Zheng finds that the Internet prompts a “recursive 
relationship” between the state and society and transforms the way interactions take place 
between them (Zheng 11). For China, in particular, that has translated into political 
liberalization in the aspects of “openness, transparency, and accountability,” which all 
ultimately benefit the state and society (Zheng 11). 
Others choose a more macro-level approach that focuses on civil society; yet 
doing so still directly highlights an important aspect of the public sphere. Here, Deibert 
and Rohozinski introduce the notion of global civil society, which serves to recognize 
how the Internet sets the stage for “associations whose political activities take them 
beyond the confines of their own sovereign states” (124). This forum also includes three 
“spheres of agency:” civic networks, resistance networks and dark nets (Deibert and 
Rohozinski 124-125). The authors contend that the latter two, associated with radical 
activity and criminal networks, can harm civic networks’ abilities to strengthen the public 
sphere by providing states with the justification to filter and deny access to certain cyber 
domains (Deibert and Rohozinski 125).  Thus, delineating a civil society as one that is 
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“global” also creates the paradox of competing spheres whose ideologies do not 
necessarily represent the most peaceful, democratic aspects of a society. 
CRITICISMS OF THE INTERNET AS POLITICAL INFLUENCER  
 Other scholars caution that before buying into the conception that ICTs carry with 
them democratizing qualities, the existence of the “fine lines” created by Internet use 
must be noted (Diamond 80). Although Diamond acknowledges Web 2.0’s expansion of 
the public sphere, he warns of how it is “tempting to think of the Internet as 
unprecedented in its potential for political progress” (71). Pointing to the historical 
evolution of communication technologies like the printing press and the telegraph, he 
argues that technology is simply a tool with the dual capacities to engender good and evil 
(Diamond 71). This duality signals technologies that can just as easily “be vehicles of 
information pluralism and rational debate,” as they can be “commandeered by totalitarian 
regimes for fanatical mobilization and total state control” (Diamond 71)  – a message also 
echoed in former Secretary of State Clinton’s January 2010 speech on Internet freedoms. 
In effect, these technologies fail to offer innovations not already witnessed by the 
introduction of other communication technologies throughout history. 
 Diamond further advises that recognizing Internet technologies’ limitations is 
important in distinguishing the dual nature of this technology’s place in politics. On the 
one hand it can foster pluralism, advocacy and expansion of the public sphere. On the 
other, their use produces the noise of too many messages, intolerance and societal 
fragmentation. While the Internet brings rise to the voices of citizens the world over, 
Diamond argues that not all of them are necessarily “rational and civil” (80).  
12 
 
 Though that critique focuses on technology as a tool, Hindman shifts focus to the 
potential conflict stemming instead from user characteristics. Despite highlighting the 
Internet’s impact in relation to U.S. politics, Hindman offers arguments easily applicable 
to the international community. The exclusionary dimension of the “digital divide” 
presents the foremost cause of skepticism. Although citizens’ access to the Internet has 
expanded during the last decade, certain segments of populations, typically those deemed 
“disadvantaged,” will remain without access and connectivity (Hindman 9). Often 
included in this category are citizens of certain age groups, races and education levels 
(Hindman 9).  
Hindman also suggests that the Internet’s effect on politics will be minimal, 
simply providing another means to conduct “politics as usual” (9). Much like Diamond, 
Hindman argues that danger also lies in the Internet’s capacity to dilute information and 
messages, in that audiences faced with millions of informational sites will cause 
“general-interest intermediaries [to] disappear, political polarization [to] accelerate, and 
public debate [to] coarsen” (Hindman 9).  
A CALL FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION 
 Internet studies research within the discipline of media and communications 
varies widely by subject, and largely does not present a unified approach in its 
assessment of Web 2.0 technologies. Some scholars work to integrate the Internet into 
media effects models, while others examine the changing structure of journalism as 
seized by “citizen” reporters or activists. If there’s any recurring message within this 
discipline’s literature it comes in the form of calling for more research and cross-
disciplinary examinations. 
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 Foremost in this realm is the argument of della Porta, a sociologist and social 
movement theorist who notes that little research exists at the intersection of the fields of 
democracy, mass media and social movements. In her article entitled “Communication in 
Movement,” she urges the importance of analysis beyond the structuralist notions of 
democracy as “electoral accountability” (della Porta 802). Media studies reflect short-
sightedness, too, in that virtually no exploration has been made between the “conditions 
and limits of media contribution to democracy” (della Porta 805). The advent of the 
Internet and Web technologies has given pause to this correlation (805), yet research 
remains fixated on technological, and not democratizing, aspects (della Porta 807). 
Instead, according to della Porta, attention within both these fields of study must shift 
toward the agents involved. Social movements research tends to lean more toward 
assessing agency, showcasing that social movements hold high esteem within 
democracies, “both by expanding the range of information and ideas, being more 
responsive to the excluded, and by impacting on the participants’ sense of the self” (della 
Porta 808). This results in more developed discussion of media environments and 
relationships between the media and publics, particularly as related to the backdrops 
against which social movements are born and develop (della Porta 810-811). In sum, 
della Porta calls for the close scrutiny of the overlapping commonalities between the 
three fields of study in order to draw further conclusions. 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL & RESEARCH DESIGN 
Cases in both Egypt and China will be examined using a conceptual model 
created to reveal the intersections of various fields of study. This framework follows della 
Porta’s call for focus on the “permeability of the borders” between the fields of 
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democracy, mass media and social movements (801). Each of the three fields of study is, 
in turn, represented by a singular dominant theory.  
An added cue in shaping this conceptual model was derived from Rice and 
Fuller’s content analysis of more than 300 scholarly articles about the Internet, 
communication and social sciences. Their assessment concluded that the literature 
contained six recurring global themes and, within those, 27 sub-themes (355). Rice and 
Fuller’s findings show that the global theme of “participation” broadly encompasses the 
sub-themes of civic engagement, political participation, and the public sphere (358-359). 
This corresponds with della Porta’s suggested areas of focus, as representative theories 
for civic engagement, political participation and the public sphere align precisely with 
representative theories for social movements, mass media and democracy. Diagram 1.1 
outlines these matches. 
 
Diagram 1.1  Patterns & Parallels in Internet Studies Research 
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At first glance, mass media and political participation may not illustrate as clear a 
connection as the other theoretical equivalents in this diagram. Worth noting here is that 
the field of mass media encompasses analysis of communication effects, which often 
focuses on political communication and, subsequently, political participation. Therein is 
the association between the two. 
DEMOCRACY 
In integrating representative theories from all three fields of study, the structural 
components will serve as units of analysis within each field. Thus, in the conceptual 
model created for this research proposal, democracy is represented by Habermas’ theory 
of communicative action. His public sphere model serves as a “reference point with 
which theorists can gauge how far a particular system deviates from truly legitimate 
representative government” (Lewis 682). According to Habermas, the public sphere, 
comprised of publics, media and state institutions, functions at both a core and periphery 
level. While the core represents state bodies and the “capacity to act,” it also acts as 
gatekeeper of public information in determining what filters through to influence “formal 
authority” (Lewis 682). Alternately, the periphery of publics seeks to exert influence over 
decision making through its “informal highly differentiated and cross-linked channels of 
communication” (Lewis 682). In this model, the media serves abundant collective 
political functions, but also focus on the “quality of participation, emphasizing an 
informed, reasoned and interactive public debate” (Lewis 683). This public sphere 
dialogue, according to Lewis, should include “rational-critical deliberation.” Without 
this, fragmented and provincial personal opinions may never unite to form “collective 
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policy preferences” (Lewis 683). The use of Web 2.0 technologies may hold a valuable 
place in assessing these agents’ interactions.   
MASS MEDIA 
In further assembling a conceptual model for this research, mass media is 
represented by discourse analysis, the assessment of a “media message” as an 
independent discourse all its own (van Dijk 26). Discourse analysis as it relates to news 
production moves away from linguistic and semantic attributes and leans more toward the 
structure and meaning of discourse in a news product, for example, a newspaper article 
(van Dijk 20). Agency in news production reflects in the fact that reporting itself is the 
interchange of dialogue between journalists and society. The media does not craft news 
without sources, and, as such, it relies on another party’s discourse to interpret events as 
they have occurred. Even the objective facts in a news story are retold with a societal bias 
(van Dijk 28). Van Dijk further emphasizes the influence of agency by stressing what 
news production is and is not.    
 More specifically, it should be stressed that news production is not a direct 
representation (biased or not) of events, but rather some form of discourse 
processing. Reporters will seldom be direct witnesses to events; rather, 
their data are mostly other discourses, such as eyewitness reports, press 
conferences, press releases, statements of officials, interviews, documents, 
or news of other media and press agencies (van Dijk 28). 
 
Operating in the background of these structures, van Dijk points out, are the beliefs and 
values held by journalists and publics alike. These seep through to dialogues, influencing 
the “production, reproduction, or understanding of the news ‘data’” (van Dijk 29). Much 
like the public sphere, the interaction of media and publics in the discourse analysis of 
news may also shape later repertoires of action. 
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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 Finally, this conceptual framework is rounded out by the addition of the three-part 
movement model to represent the field of social movements. Scholars generally agree 
upon the same three units of analysis, or components of a social movement, to gain an 
understanding of potential social change (McAdam et al. 2). This triad of focal points 
includes weaknesses in the political landscape that may translate into prospects for the 
aggrieved; the resources available to participants to organize a movement; and, finally, 
“the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that 
mediate between opportunity and action” (McAdam et al. 2). To social movement 
theorists, these areas of concentration equate simply to political opportunities, mobilizing 
structures and framing processes (McAdam et al. 2).  
 The final component of the social movement approach includes consideration of 
the framing processes, or narrative generation, needed to spur collective action (McAdam 
et al. 4). Cooperatively this accounts for what Beck calls the “rhetorical and symbolic 
side of political contention” (1569). Also dubbed the “vocabulary of motives,” these 
unique languages affirm movement participation through the construction of 
justifications not only for purposes of defense but also for recruitment (Beaford et al. 
2721). Snow contends that framing serves to construct “interpretive” schema that bring 
order and understanding to an existing reality (Tarrow 142). With opportunity and 
organization accounted for, participants in a movement require a form of commonality, or 
shared meaning, to further spur them into action. Framing processes round out this 
repertoire, bringing “collective attribution” and “social construction” to an otherwise 
inexplicable cause (McAdam et al. 5). 
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Early assessments of the specified democracy, mass media and social movement 
theories reflect that each field of study includes an arena whereby media and publics have 
a capacity to interact and deliberate. It is these relations and subsequent exchanges – 
should they be found to exist – that could well serve to influence citizen action as 
directed toward state institutions. The confluence of interactive and deliberative elements, 
when paired with Web 2.0 technologies, may reveal more commonalities not yet 
detected. If so, these added areas of overlap may re-direct case analysis and call for 
revisions to the outlined conceptual model. The sum of this research’s multi-study 
framework is illustrated in Diagram 1.2. 
 
Specific resources will be referenced to gather contextual data that will form the 
backdrop against which these cases are analyzed. The Population Reference Bureau, a 
collection of data compiling scores of population-related variables, will be consulted to 
gather demographic data about youth populations in each country. This youth 
demographic is targeted specifically for its greater likelihood to adopt and integrate Web 
Diagram 1.2  Integrative Conceptual Model of Internet Analysis 
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2.0 technologies into daily activities. Additionally, scores from multiple Freedom House 
reports will form the baseline for determining regime type, media freedom and Internet 
accessibility and control. For example, Freedom in the World, Freedom of the Press and 
Freedom on the Net provide scores for levels of state-owned media, levels of Internet 
freedom, and, more generally, the levels of a population’s freedom. A number of digital 
resources will also be consulted, to include country-specific Internet monitoring sites 
like China Digital Times and Al-Monitor. The reporting on these sites provides both 
current and historical reference points by which to gauge a country’s level of Internet 
freedom. 
TIMEFRAME & CASES FOR EXAMINATION 
The research proposed here will be qualitative, with a focus on the two countries 
of Egypt and China during the timeframe of 2005 to 2010. Note that application of this 
conceptual model to specified cases also intends to be largely exploratory in nature, and, 
while some expected findings have been outlined, it is anticipated that others will 
undoubtedly surface through examination. Selected cases will be evaluated to determine 
what George and Bennett call the “causal pathways [that] might operate in them” (234). 
Application of this conceptual model, therefore, will also rely upon induction to better 
fine-tune and solidify a working theory. Special attention will be paid to George and 
Bennett’s caution to avoid restriction of case selection so as not to impede theory 
building (241).  
The same reliance on induction will also hold for the outlining of relevant 
variables. The use of an integrative research model allows for potentially isolating what 
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George and Bennett refer to as “identifying clusters of characteristics that differentiate 
instances of the phenomenon” (238). Once more fully identified, these variables can be 
further examined for validity and then categorization. It’s this type of categorization that 
will eventually yield a more solid typological theory (George & Bennett 238). 
The short lifespan of some social media platforms in general, paired with even 
shorter histories in specific world regions, aided in setting the timeframe. While 
interactivity on the Internet has existed in varying forms since the technology’s first 
public uses in the 1990s, the interactive software platforms that are most familiar today 
did not gain popularity until more than a decade later. For example, Facebook was 
opened to the general public in the United States in 2006, about four years after its first 
uses among U.S. universities and later high schools. Facebook did not reach the Middle 
East region until 2009. Similarly, YouTube, a video sharing site, debuted to the public in 
2005, with micro-blogging website Twitter following one year later in 2006. Based on 
these origins, these technologies can only collectively be examined here for a very short 
span. China’s Web 2.0 history offers its own unique story in the region. In this country, 
most of these Western social media sites remain formally blocked or limited in use by the 
government’s direction, with equivalent Chinese social network sites like Sina Weibo and 
RenRen standing instead in their place. While these Chinese-based sites allow for ease of 
monitoring by government authorities, their existence does not preclude citizens from 
accessibility to Western social media. The public’s use of proxy servers and virtual 
private networks bypasses censors and provides an alternate path to Western sites where 
public opinion is more readily shared. Alternately, Internet users have adapted to 
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government censorship by using an “extensive series of puns — both visual and 
homophonous” to voice opinion on Chinese sites like Weibo (Xu). 
The Chinese and Egyptian cases outlined below provide a snapshot of a more 
comprehensive sampling of Web 2.0 technology use within the aforementioned 
timeframe.  
EGYPT 
For focus on Egypt, this time period will examine the years immediately 
preceding the Arab Spring. The April 6 Youth, an anti-government group organized in 
2007, was the first Egyptian oppositional organization to add Web 2.0 technologies 
Facebook and Twitter to a pre-existing line-up of digital resources. Under the leadership 
of Ahmed Maher, the April 6 Youth remained rooted in reviving the country’s labor 
movement with the added aim of “spreading the strikes and transforming them into [a] 
general prodemocracy movement.” This group borrows its name from its first general 
strike slated for April 6, 2008 (Lim 239). While this protest was met with military force, 
it did succeed in disabling day-to-day operations in parts of the country. Also worth 
noting is the group’s ability to garner global interest in the strikes through its use of Web 
2.0 technologies (Lim 240). The full spectrum of April 6 Youth-led protests were by and 
large deemed productive by the group itself, and its attempt at online mobilization 
introduced to other activists new digital mobilizing resources (Lim 241). Howard and 
Hussain note that this movement embraced Web 2.0 technologies incrementally 
throughout the group’s lifespan and “not simply during the phase of street protests” 
(105).  
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Another relevant Egyptian case is the protest group named “We are all Khaled 
Said,” which initially emerged on Facebook in 2010. This organization formed with the 
objective of bringing public attention to the beating death of Khaled Said, a 28-year-old 
target of police brutality. The Egyptian police seized Said from an Internet café in 
Alexandria, and beat him in the street for alleged drug dealing. Internet chatter, however, 
revealed that police victimized Said for possession of video footage showing “police 
officers sharing the spoils of a drug bust” (Lim 241). As images of Said’s injuries 
circulated heavily online, he became the symbol of dissidence against the Mubarak 
regime (Lim 241). Bolstered by its representation of the collective “we,” the organization 
took to Facebook to organize protests in Cairo and Alexandria. Within two months, the 
group organized thousands of Egyptians into five silent protests. While anti-Mubarak 
movements already existed, this protest group became iconic in its ability to “put a face 
on” life under the dictator’s rule. Said’s death is also said to serve as the triggering event 
that incited “actual participation in collective action and social movements” (Lim 242.) 
The examination of these cases proves particularly relevant given the 2011 
overthrow of President Mubarak and the country’s resulting government transition.  
Assessing the years leading up to these events may reveal valuable data about patterns of 
Web 2.0 use. This time period also encompasses a span in which, by December 2010, the 
count of anti-government bloggers in Egypt who had been threatened, arrested or 
released reached about 31 (Ghannam 26). 
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CHINA 
Within the same time period in China came the 2009 arrest of Deng Yujiao, a 21-
year-old female employee of an entertainment establishment offering restaurant, salon 
and spa services in Hubei Province (MacKinnon 31). After a customer and local 
Communist Party official “demanded sex with her,” Deng stabbed the official, ultimately 
killing him, and also injured one of his friends. Police responded by arresting Deng and 
confining her to a mental hospital (French 42). The arrest and confinement sparked robust 
discussion online, which further ignited when investigative blogger Tu Fu photographed 
Deng strapped to a bed at the institution. When posted online, the images spurred public 
outrage and subsequent demands for Chinese officials to dismiss Deng’s murder charges. 
The charges were eventually downgraded, and Deng was released from hospital 
confinement. Similar to the elevation of Khaled Said by Egyptians as a personification of 
state repression, Deng Yujiao came to symbolize women’s vulnerability in the hands of 
the CCP. Women used the slogan, “Anyone could become a Deng Yujiao,” to relay this 
(French 42). Scholars speculate that when the state realized that “a conviction could spark 
riots, the authorities eventually dropped the murder charges” (MacKinnon 31). 
A number of Chinese cases stem from the destruction of the Sichuan Province 
earthquake in 2008. Ai Weiwei, an artist and blogger, brought government corruption to a 
fore by aiding local families, bloggers and human rights attorneys in gathering and 
sharing information about children who perished in the collapsed schools (MacKinnon 
248). Online discussion of corrupt local officials, who had permitted sub-standard 
construction of school buildings, propelled parents of deceased children to protest in want 
of answers. In a similar vein, teacher Liu Shaokun was detained and sentenced to labor in 
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June 2008 for posting pictures of destroyed buildings online (Deibert et al. 458). Overall, 
the Sichuan Province earthquake highlighted the notion that state-controlled media did 
not impede online reporting and debate from stepping in to fill that informational void 
(Lewis 685). 
China, operating behind its Great Firewall, bears similarities to Egypt in that its 
people are under the governance of one-party rule and China’s population is comprised of 
a sizable youth demographic. The country’s government also offers a diverse history of 
Internet censorship and controlled access that provides measured examples to assess. 
Among these are incidents surrounding the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the arrest and 
imprisonment of Internet activists.  
These cases from both Egypt and China will be examined as a means to better 
develop expected findings and draw further inferences about the relationships between 
different involved publics. Special attention has been paid here to refer to “findings” 
versus hypotheses. This is due primarily to the above-described need to first identify 
variables long before constructing hypotheses for a given theory. The model of a “most 
similar” research design best accommodates this research not only for commonalities 
between the two countries’ authoritarian regimes, but also for their similarities in state-
run media outlets and established histories of Internet censorship. A research design 
structured around similar cases will aid in determining different variables’ potential 
inclusion or exclusion, depending on specified outcome. These inferences may yield 
significant results, especially given that the research spans multiple fields of study that, as 
yet, lack a unified approach in both structure and breadth. Finally, this type of research 
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design offers the best venue by which to explore policy recommendations, a previously 
mentioned ancillary objective of conducting this research
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II. CHINA 
 
The Integrative Conceptual Model of Internet Analysis (ICMIA) included in 
Chapter 1 further reveals more pointed areas of overlap among the three representative 
theoretical models and their accompanying units of analysis. An apparent commonality to 
both democratization and mass media are the agents of publics operating within the 
public sphere and society operating within discourse analysis. Another common 
denominator is drawn from the agent of media that operates both within the public sphere 
and discourse analysis theories. Worth noting here is that the additional agent of the state 
within the public sphere theory, in some respects, operates in conjunction with the media. 
Both countries examined in this research, for example, govern their countries’ respective 
media organizations. The collaborative nature between the entities of media and state 
does not, however, explain the independent actions taken by other state-run 
organizations. If these independent actions should become crucial to an incident’s 
understanding, they will be noted well beyond the aforementioned media-state 
partnership.  
Finally, and perhaps less apparent, is the media-public interaction that occurs 
within social movement theory. More specifically, this interaction takes place within the 
structures component of the three-part social movement theory. It’s here that the Internet 
(Tarrow 121) can act to help “constitute organizational structures joining diverse and 
often widely dispersed activists” (Tarrow 137). The media’s online reporting can act to 
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forge associations in ways that historically were “transposed into pamphlet wars, ribald 
songs and … cartoons and prints,” showcasing the struggles that arise between the 
common man and his opponents (Tarrow 62). The interactions between these entities, as 
mediated by the Internet, may well serve as the basis for collective action that leads to 
social movement.  
SETTING THE STAGE FOR CASE ANALYSIS 
 Each Internet-related incident included in forthcoming chapters will include three 
sections outlining the ICMIA’s overlap of public-media interactions. The first section sets 
the stage, explaining the scenario and describing generally these agents’ interactions as 
they develop; the second section reflects how these interactions form the basis of the 
media’s message; and, finally, the third section details how public-media interactions 
serve to form the structures – networks and organizations – in potential collective action. 
INDIVIDUAL VS. LOCAL OFFICIALS: DENG YUJIAO, 2009 
On May 10, 2009, Deng Yujiao, a 21-year-old female employee of an 
entertainment establishment in Hubei Province, was arrested by police and charged on 
suspicion of murder and the use of “excessive force” (MacKinnon 31; Browne n.p.). A 
local CCP official and patron of the hotel, requested from Deng “special service” – a 
euphemism for sex. After her refusal, the official became physical and Deng stabbed him, 
ultimately killing him and injuring one of his friends (Browne n.p.). Deng called the 
police to report the crime, considering her attack self-defense against an attempted rape 
(“Victim of Rape Attempt” 32). Despite her victimization, police arrested Deng for 
stabbing the official (“Stab at Reform” 40). 
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Not long after, police confined Deng to a mental hospital (French 42). Since 
police had found anti-depressants in Deng’s bag at the time of her arrest, the police 
reported that she suffered from “mental instability” (“Stab at Reform” 40). Eighteen days 
later on May 28, police released Deng from the mental institution on bail and ordered her 
to home confinement until her trial (Chao A7). Two days later the police finished its 
investigation of the case and transferred it to the provincial court (“Victim of Rape 
Attempt” 33). On June 2, Deng’s surviving attacker, also a CCP official, was fired from 
his government post (Browne n.p.), but no charges were brought against him (“Stab at 
Reform” 40). Nearly two weeks later, and a little more than a month after her initial 
arrest, the Chinese court dismissed Deng’s murder charges but upheld the charge of 
excessive force (“Stab at Reform” 40). 
FORMATION OF THE MEDIA MESSAGE 
 Media first reported on the Deng case just days after her arrest (Huang 734), with 
three local newspapers publishing the stories in print and posting those same stories 
online (Tang and Sampson 464). Netizens immediately took to the ‘comment’ section of 
the stories where, according to Tang and Sampson, “The expressed opinion was almost 
universally one-sided and the comment – ‘The official’s death is well deserved. We 
strongly request the release of the heroine who got rid of an evil for the people’ – was 
widely supported” (464). Huang echoes this observation, stating that most all online 
comments supported Deng’s being “hailed as a national heroine, even as a sword master, 
who resisted lecherous officials and maintained the traditional virtue of women” (732).  
A number of netizens expanded the reach of their reactions by “cross-posting” the 
same comments to Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) (Tang and Sampson 464). BBS are 
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known to be safer havens to Chinese netizens, given that they generally offer more 
freedom to debate issues and less censorship from authorities (Chao A7). Amid building 
public opinion, local officials in Badong County, site of the attack and arrest, posted a 
headline to an agency website “inviting anyone concerned with the case to call the 
county’s news and information center” (Chao and Zhang A7). Netizens, however, 
continued posting online comments in support of Deng. One netizen going by the handle 
of ‘Watching Over China’ wrote on a People’s Daily Web forum that the attack date 
“will forever be remembered as the day on which a [girl] bravely defended herself and 
fought against the corrupt official when her life was threatened.” Another, going by the 
name ‘Guo Chunfu,’ posted that Deng “used her own acts to show that even the 
underprivileged can have a dignified life” (Chao and Zhang A7). This outpouring of 
support in the form of online commentary garnered attention all its own, and prompted 
the Chinese media to examine the case with greater scrutiny than initially reported (Tang 
and Sampson 464). 
While Deng’s arrest sparked robust discussion online, it further ignited when 
investigative blogger Tu Fu photographed Deng strapped to a bed, crying at the mental 
institution (French 42). Tu Fu, whose real name is Wu Gan, funded the trip to the Badong 
facility through requests he posted on the Kaidi BBS asking netizens to help him raise 
money for his travels there. The money, he wrote online, would also fund his travel to 
visit Deng’s family and offer legal services. Wu’s photo and video of Deng’s 
confinement served to uphold his stated commitment to blog as further developments 
unfolded (Tang and Sampson 465). Once released, this video reached mass audiences 
when it was televised on a Chinese television station. The release of these images directly 
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increased online commentary, and subsequently the media took notice – it increased its 
own reporting, this time focused on the online commentary (Huang 734). The flood of 
commentary propelled journalists to focus more closely on their investigation of the case 
and netizens reciprocated by further “scrutiniz[ing], question[ing] and discuss[ing] every 
report in detail” (Tang and Sampson 465).  
This steady engagement between media reporting and netizen reporting put public 
opinion in the spotlight, thus positioning netizens’ agenda to guide the state media’s 
reporting (Tang and Sampson 465). As this tit-for-tat unfolded online, the Chinese 
Communist Party took notice that it was losing grip on its span of control both with 
regard to the Internet and professional journalists. On May 22, the CCP’s State Council 
Information Office based in Beijing issued an instruction to media to ease its emphasis on 
the reporting of the Deng case (Tang and Sampson 466), and specifically called for 
websites to delete any reporting considered “harmful information that viciously attacks 
the CCP and the government, attacks the Justice system, or promotes democracy and 
human rights” (“Victim of Rape Attempt” 33). The instruction’s effects produced 
demonstrative results a mere four days later: Wu’s blog was shut down by government 
censors; in Yesanguan, the town where the attack occurred, television and Internet were 
shut down (Wines 6); journalists dispatched to Badong County to continue their reporting 
met with local officials who ordered their withdrawal (Tang and Sampson 466) and some 
journalists were beaten when they did not comply; and, with the screening of outsiders to 
Badong, also came the halt of public transportation into the province (Wines 6). 
After the verdict was announced on June 16, netizens continued their hold on the 
Internet as a forum for public opinion. A netizen from Guangdong posted to popular 
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Chinese web forum Tianya.com that the verdict was a “significant victory of Chinese 
Internet users and Chinese democracy” (Chao A7). Another wrote that “No matter what, 
this [was] partly the victory of public opinion” (McCabe A11). According to a June 17 
New York Times article, netizens posted more than 4 million comments about the Deng 
case (Wines 6). State-run China Central Television conducted an online survey from May 
16 to June 6, 2009, asking what respondents thought would be the appropriate 
punishment for Deng. Of 117, 001 responses, 92.89 percent of the respondents thought it 
fit the legal definition of “self-defense” and that Deng should not be convicted of any 
crime; 6.31 percent of the respondents thought it was excessive defense and that Deng 
should not be convicted of intentional homicide; and, only 0.80 percent of respondents 
thought it was hard to tell (Huang 734). 
CONSTRUCTION OF NETWORKS & ORGANIZATIONS  
Legal scholar Xuanyu Huang notes that as online comments proliferated in the 
Deng case, it simultaneously allowed for citizens to join in “associations and formations” 
that might not otherwise have occurred (728). This is due in large part to the Chinese 
government’s strict restrictions regarding offline organizing (Huang 728). Fueled here by 
inequities of social class (Huang 725), but also by inequalities of power and gender 
(Huang 735), netizens largely united to highlight perceptions of “pervasive government 
corruption” (Huang 725). By extension, this encouraged what Tang and Sampson refer to 
as internet incidents, or the collective activity spontaneously developed among netizens 
(457). Yu’s statistics citing mass protest in China mirror this, reflecting that in slightly 
more than 10 years’ time from 1993 to 2005, mass protests have increased from 8,700 to 
87,000 (qtd. in Huang 730). 
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 News reports indicate that two small protests were organized between the date 
that Deng’s case was first reported by media and the date her court verdict was 
announced – roughly a span of 36 days (“Stab at Reform” 40). One protest took place 
near the Beijing West Railway Station around May 20 (Chao and Zhang A7). The 
gathering there of a women’s rights group brought together five women who used 
performance art to make a statement about the Deng case (“Stab at Reform” 40). One of 
the protestors in attendance said the demonstration aimed to bring women’s rights to a 
fore (Chao and Zhang A7). Another participant wrapped her body in white cloth, almost 
mummy-like so that her arms and legs appeared restrained. She similarly covered her 
face in the same cloth, so that her mouth was concealed and only her eyes and forehead 
shown (“Stab at Reform” 40). She lay down on the floor alongside a sheet of paper that 
read, “Anyone may become Deng Yujiao” (Chao and Zhang A7).  
MULTIPLE INDIVIDUALS VS. STATE BUSINESS: SANLU MILK 
SCANDAL, 2008 
 In March 2008, Chinese dairy company Sanlu heard chatter from consumers that 
its milk powder was producing serious side effects in the infants drinking it (Chao, Zhang 
and Champion A8). Despite this, just two months later the CCP’s food quality agency 
rated China’s dairy companies “among the safest producers in China’s food industry” 
(Yardley et al. 1). The Dairy Association of China also favorably reported that Sanlu had 
“topped the country’s dairy makers in infant formula sales for 15 years in a row” (Hu 24). 
Sanlu’s profitable milk powder resulted primarily from its being marketed as the least 
expensive of milk powder brands sold in China (Hu 24). By May, a 5-month-old baby in 
Gansu Province died after drinking the powdered formula (Toy 14). 
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The following month, Sanlu was informed that another infant was hospitalized 
after drinking the company’s milk powder (Chao, Zhang, and Champion A8), and 
another baby in Gansu Province died in July, again after drinking Sanlu’s powdered 
formula (Toy 14). In August – the same month as the opening ceremonies for the 2008 
Beijing Olympic summer games – melamine was pinpointed as being the contaminant in 
Sanlu’s formula (Chao, Zhang, and Champion A8). The addition of melamine to milk 
powder boosts the product’s protein level when tested, thereby allowing it to meet quality 
standards for sale to consumers. When ingested, melamine, a chemical commonly found 
in plastics, fertilizers and cleaning products, can cause stones to form in the kidneys and 
urinary tracts of infants and children (Hu 24). A daily newspaper broke the story in 
September, publishing an article about Sanlu’s role in the milk contamination (Veil and 
Yang 936).  
 Although Sanlu initially maintained its innocence and claimed itself a victim by 
sabotage (Veil and Yang 936-937), its CEO Tian Huawen admitted to contamination of 
its milk products and awareness of it for a month prior to any public reports surfacing 
(Hu 24). Around September 15, Sanlu issued a public apology, recalling nearly 700 tons 
of the milk powder. News outlets reported the death of a third infant in early September, 
along with the two others that had taken place between four and five months prior to the 
milk scandal breaking (Toy 14). By the next day, police had questioned 78 people and 
arrested four allegedly connected to lacing Sanlu products with melamine. 
Simultaneously, the Chinese State Council created and launched an investigative 
team to better regulate food safety and food quality. The Council also issued a statement 
on its website asking that people stop drinking the milk powder (Hu 24). A fourth baby 
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died in Xinjiang Province on September 18, and the state continued its manhunt for the 
perpetrators. Police formally arrested 18 individuals and accused six of selling melamine 
to milk suppliers. At final count, Sanlu’s tainted milk powder produced staggering 
effects: From September to December 2008, the Chinese Ministry of Health reported the 
hospitalization of about 51,900 babies; 294,000 infants with urinary tract stones; more 
than 1,000 babies confirmed to have kidney stones; and, six infant deaths (Rodriquez and 
Yao 110). By early January 2009, the state had arrested 60 people in connection with the 
line of tainted milk, and the trials of four Sanlu executives had just recently began. On 
January 21 and 22, Hebei provincial courts sentenced 21 people related to contaminated 
milk products with punishments ranging from death sentences to jail terms. Included in 
these sentences were punishments for Sanlu executives and milk producers and traders 
(“Timeline: China Milk Scandal” n.p.). 
FORMATION OF THE MEDIA MESSAGE 
The Xinhua News Agency reported on September 9, 2008, that 14 babies in 
Gansu Province were hospitalized with kidney stones (Hu 24). Just two days later, the 
Oriental Morning Post published the story that broke the news of Sanlu’s involvement 
with the tainted milk (Veil and Yang 936). This story revealed that the dairy company 
had known about the contamination of its milk powder, but continued to sell the 
melamine-laced product. From the first moment the Chinese media reported on Sanlu’s 
tainted milk supply, it took on the role of risk reporting. Especially in crisis situations, the 
media, perhaps inadvertently, retains the singular role of disseminating reliable 
information to a public that looks to it to “cope with the threat” and decide how best to 
act (Rodriquez and Yao 110). Through the lens of netizens, however, this media role was 
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met with both suspicion and criticism. This is due partly to cultural constraints and the 
Chinese media’s inherent role to act as a mouthpiece of the state, strictly avoid criticism 
of the CCP, and serve as a venue for the party’s “prevailing ideology” (Rodriquez and 
Yao 110).  
Veil and Yang propose that, although the state attempted to thwart media 
transparency throughout the Sanlu milk scandal, netizens voicing their opinions online 
actually built greater transparency – even in the face of some calculated business dealings 
aiming for the contrary (937). Despite a media landscape influenced by journalists’ 
acceptance of bribes and publications’ coverage swayed by advertising dollars (Veil and 
Yang 935), netizens’ “tremendous public reaction” contributed to driving Sanlu’s 
executive decisions and, thus, once again media coverage (Veil and Yang 937). 
Within hours of the Post story going online and getting cross-posted, netizen 
reaction surged in response to news of the contaminated milk (Veil and Yang 936-937). 
On September 12, Sanlu CEO Tian stated, “This issue is caused by some illegal activities 
in the purchase process of original milk. Sanlu is innocent in the entire case, and is also a 
victim” (Veil and Yang 937). Just three days later, Sanlu issued a formal statement of 
apology, in which the company not only took some accountability for the tainted milk, 
but also issued a recall of milk powder. It also offered to compensate families for the 
medical expenses incurred by their sick infants (Veil and Yang 937).   
An examination of 27 stories by The Economic Daily, a paper published by the 
State Council of the Central Propaganda Department, shows that this newspaper initially 
focused its reporting on the Chinese government’s ability to rebound from the crisis in an 
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attempt to quell public reaction (Rodriquez and Yao 112). In line with the statements 
made by Sanlu executives, the Daily’s reporting transitioned to reflect the placement of 
blame on milk suppliers and producers versus that of Sanlu itself. The newspaper’s media 
message then shifted to one of calling for “stronger business ethics” (Rodriquez and Yao 
113). This undoubtedly corresponded with the State Council’s establishment of an 
investigative team led by the Ministry of Health (Hu 24). As part of this initiative the 
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) 
commenced an inspection of China’s 109 formula makers – it later found that 22 of them 
produced melamine-laced products (Hu 24).  
As in the case of Deng Yujiao, netizens created their own over-arching and 
opposing media message online. Their message, however, not only responded to the 
actions outlined above, but also pointed to a clear lapse between the first infant deaths – 
long before first news of them – and Sanlu’s ownership of the problem.  An example 
highlighting this is that of blogger Fu Jianfeng, who also happened to be the editor at the 
independent weekly publication Southern Weekend (Yardley et al. 1). Two months before 
news first broke about the tainted milk, reporters at Weekend had discovered the issue 
and were ready to go to print, but the government forbade it due to the upcoming 
Olympic opening ceremonies. Instead, Fu took to his blog to convey the discovery. In 
this forum, Fu wrote that Sanlu “applied pressure to block reporting and used its political 
connections to prevent some other newspapers from publishing articles about the 
problem.” Fu’s blog post was eventually removed from the Internet as part of the 
government’s edict to get permission from the CCP before publishing articles about food 
safety and “other politically delicate subjects” (Yardley et al. 1).  
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Similarly, on June 30 – practically a full two months prior to the discovery of the 
tainted milk – a mother with a sick infant in Hunan Province wrote a letter to the AQSIQ 
pleading for aid, and for Sanlu to issue a recall, report on the issue and grant medical 
compensation for children’s treatment (Yardley et al. 1). The letter got posted to the 
AQSIQ’s website, but, like Fu’s blog post, it was removed in the days leading up to the 
revelation that Sanlu played a role in manufacturing and distributing bad milk (Yardley et 
al. 1). On the same September day that Sanlu admitted to its role in the milk scandal, a 
netizen wrote of the mother’s letter and how it had once been posted to the AQSIQ’s 
website but had since been removed (“Timeline” 41). 
Another instance of a netizen’s early discovery of the issue occurred in May, 
again months before Sanlu’s admission of accountability, when Wang Yuanping posted 
an article to Tianya about his 7-year-old daughter’s ailments after drinking Sanlu milk 
powder (Yardley et al. 1; “Chinese Netizens Question” n.p.). Initially, the article got 
buried. When it re-emerged it received more than 90,000 comments saying that his 
daughter’s situation could have been avoided had Sanlu attended to the complaint 
(“Chinese Netizens Question” n.p.). Echoing this sentiment, a user named ‘myy8206’ 
posted the following comment on the forum xici.net, “Where are the concerned parties 
that are supposed to inspect the quality? They should be taken out and shot!” (Magnier 
A4).  
CONSTRUCTION OF NETWORKS & ORGANIZATIONS 
 One of the most prominent Internet activists related to the tainted Sanlu milk also 
played a pivotal hand in the unification and organization of affected families. In late 
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September 2008 Zhao Lianhai, a former employee of China’s Food Quality and Safety 
Authority and a former journalist, created a website seeking help after his 3-year-old son 
was diagnosed with kidney stones (“Father of ‘Toxic Milk’ Child” n.p.; Jacobs A12; Cha 
A1). Within days, more than 4,000 families with a child either hurt or killed by the 
poisoned milk joined the site, and the Melamine Victims’ Parents Alliance was born. 
What started by Zhao as a site for discussing children’s medical care transformed into a 
virtual location for questioning government accountability and demanding compensation 
(Cha A1). 
Through connections forged with families through the website, Zhao compiled a 
database of information about the affected children and posted it online. Zhao made 
himself accessible to other parents by way of his instant-messaging program, which he 
kept open each day for 24 hours in order to document parents’ reports of the melamine’s 
effects on their children (Chao and Dean 8). The network created through the site allowed 
for Zhao and parents to establish a presence at key points in the investigation into Sanlu’s 
role in the poisoned milk. Whether at the sentencing of company officials or at the 
auction of assets during the company’s bankruptcy, the group united to hold up signs that 
read, “Killers should pay with their own lives,” and, “We want to participate in the 
prosecution” (Cha A1). The group, which also eventually went by the name Kidney 
Stone Babies, lobbied against the central government’s Ministry of Health to make 
strides toward a “national compensation plan that allocated cash to victims based on age 
and severity of illness” (Cha A1). 
Almost immediately after Zhao’s establishing the site, the government tried to 
shut it down (Cha A1).To maintain the site’s presence, Zhao outran government censors 
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by switching servers, using filter circumnavigation tools and continuously changing the 
Web address (Cha A1; Chao and Dean 8). This surveillance culminated into Zhao’s 
November 2009 detention, and his being charged with “creating a disturbance” in March 
2010. Later that same year, the Chinese courts sentenced Zhao to two-and-a-half years in 
jail, a year of which he had already served during his arrest and detention (“Father of 
‘Toxic Milk’ Child” n.p.). 
MULTIPLE INDIVIDUALS VS. LOCAL & STATE OFFICIALS: 
COLLAPSED SCHOOLS OF THE SICHUAN EARTHQUAKE, 2008 
 On May 12, 2008, at 2:28 p.m., a 7.9 magnitude earthquake struck the 
southwestern province of Sichuan. A province described as largely poor, heavily 
populated and mountainous, Sichuan emerged from the quake with swaths of destruction 
and the government reporting an initial death toll of more than 12,000, with 26,000 
injured and another 9,400 buried in debris (Hessler 108; Garnaut and McDonald 1; Chao 
and Leow 1). Among the first post-quake observations was the marked contrast in 
infrastructure’s response to the quake: buildings in poorer rural areas experienced far 
more damage than those located in more affluent cities. Further, a more pointed trend 
emerged when early reports of nine schools collapsing during the quake morphed into an 
online BBS reporting more than 8,300 schools and dorms destroyed throughout the quake 
zone (Chao and Leow 1; Spencer and Jin A6). 
 Already familiar with disaster response after a 1976 earthquake in Tangshan, the 
Chinese government this time spurred itself into immediate action and dispatched 
Premier Wen Jiabao to the Sichuan capital of Chengdu within two hours of the quake 
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(Fowler and Dean 9). In the coming days Wen continued touring the quake zone, at one 
point pausing to shout words of encouragement into the rubble for any trapped survivors 
to hear (Fowler and Dean 9; Garnaut and McDonald 1). Chinese media followed the 
premier’s every move, projecting a public image that conveyed a “strong leader in touch 
with the needs of common people” (Fowler and Dean 9).  
 Three days after the quake, the central government formally accepted offers of 
help from foreign rescue teams – another departure from Beijing’s past earthquake 
disaster response which wholly rejected aid (Garnaut and McDonald 1; Goodspeed A1). 
Murmurs about the school children killed in collapsing schools continued, with the 
chatter mounting into allegations of government corruption related to lax building codes 
and cheap construction. Initially, parents of the deceased school children were not 
impeded from speaking out about these suspicions (Gee A17). This reinforced the central 
government’s apparent move toward greater transparency. A May 16 online question-
and-answer forum between the CCP and citizens with queries about the collapsed schools 
seemed to signal even further openness (Anna 1). However, this accessibility diminished 
as questions remained about the collapsed schools, and gradually the government took 
actions aimed at maintaining parents’ silence. Fences cropped up around school grounds; 
bulldozers leveled the remaining rubble; and, the Propaganda Ministry issued a directive 
asking journalists to file stories that “stress unity, stability and positive publicity” (Gee 
A17; Goodspeed A1). As the August date for the opening ceremonies of the Beijing 
Olympics hedged in closer, reports surfaced in mid-July of the government buying off 
parents in exchange for their silence. Local and central government officials offered some 
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parents between $8,500 to $9,000 for their promise to not “participate in efforts that 
[would] affect overall rebuilding efforts” (Fairclough A7; Gee A17).  
 By the end of May, government officials attempted to pre-empt more damning 
allegations by publicly hinting at the potential for corruption to have played a hand in the 
collapse of schools. An Education Ministry spokesman stated during a May 27 press 
conference, “We can’t rule out the possibility that someone did bad things in the process 
of construction.” Local officials in towns throughout the quake zone followed suit by 
pledging to launch investigations into the causes behind the faulty schools (Oster A15). 
Just two days later, the vice inspector of the Sichuan Provincial Educational Department 
withdrew himself from participation in the Olympic torch rally after becoming the “first 
official to publicly acknowledge that corruption might have contributed to the collapses” 
(Blanchard n.p.) In a statement to Xinhua, Lin Qiang also referenced allowing for 
“loopholes for corruption” that ultimately resulted in Beichuan schools crumbling. In 
another May 29 news conference, the deputy head of the General Administration of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine said the department was investigating the 
school collapses, and would level appropriately severe punishments if “substandard 
materials” were discovered (Blanchard n.p.). Not long after the release of these officials’ 
statements, a Sichuan official resigned citing the burden he felt by his own role in the 
high student death toll (Jacobs, “China Sentences Activist” 4). 
 By early June 2008, almost one month after the quake, the death toll reached a 
total of 70,000 (“Outrage Replaces Grief” n.p.). Discrepancies remained in the reported 
number of school children’s deaths. China’s state media reported in late May the deaths 
of more than 6,500 students. Meanwhile, citizens combined media and online statistics to 
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arrive at an estimate of at least 10,000 student deaths (Blanchard n.p.). The Washington 
Post reported that by mid-July more than 9,000 school children had perished in collapsed 
buildings (Drew B6).  
 The CCP released a report by year’s end acknowledging that schools across the 
country had been ill-constructed and that “20 percent of primary schools in one 
southwestern province may be unsafe” (“Sichuan Earthquake” n.p.). As the one-year 
anniversary of the quake approached, Sichuan education department authorities poised 
themselves to “head off public criticism” by holding a press conference announcing the 
state’s official count of student deaths (Jacobs and Wong n.p.; Kuhn n.p.). During this 
May 7, 2009, briefing, spokesman Tu Wentao revealed that 5,335 children were dead or 
missing and that 546 were left disabled. Tu emphasized that the numbers were accurate 
and attained through “legal methods,” despite bearing no further identifying data like 
names, ages and places of death. These official statistics, so disparate from initial 
estimates, aroused citizens’ suspicions further (Jacobs and Wong n.p.). Although parents’ 
continued to press the issue of government accountability, few avenues existed for 
families to pursue recourse. Local governments’ initial promises to investigate the causes 
behind the faulty schools yielded no responsible parties and, subsequently, no 
punishments. Parents attempting to file cases in provincial courts met with authorities 
who could not “accept cases that they do not approve in advance,” and further attempts to 
elevate concerns to the central government were similarly met with being “blocked, 
detained and harassed” (Kuhn n.p.). 
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FORMATION OF THE MEDIA MESSAGE 
 The earthquake’s geographic reach and effects on the province’s landscape 
allowed for citizens to unify online almost instantaneously by reporting the event both 
during and after the quake hit. Citizens’ amateur videos were posted to websites 
immediately after the quake, creating a reference by which to gauge the disaster’s 
geography and severity. The first video to appear online was that taken by a Sichuan 
University student. This blurry amateur footage contained imagery of a shaking building, 
the view of a courtyard below filling with evacuating people and falling debris. These 
images were accompanied by the student’s narration giving the time and location and 
urging citizens to “go online” and “tell others” about the quake (Wang 264). Another 
video of the disaster taken by a blogger named ‘Awflasher’ documented his or her 
evacuation from the 15th floor of an office building. After posting this imagery to 
YouTube, it became the video-sharing site’s featured video just one day later (Wang 
264). Simultaneously, online chatrooms saw a surge in users “commenting, criticizing 
and asking for more information” about the earthquake (Goodspeed A1). According to 
Sina.com, between May 12 and May 19, “4,830 pieces of visual news shot by personal 
web-camera were transmitted to China’s four leading news websites and 6,113 pieces to 
China’s four dominant web portals” (Wang 264).  
Traditional media outlets also broke news of the quake, albeit with greater delay 
than citizen reporters had. Nearly 20 minutes after the disaster struck, the Xinhua News 
Agency reported on the quake (Wang 263). The Chinese propaganda department issued a 
media directive just another 10 minutes later. This initial directive instructed reporters to 
avoid the quake site, and use only reports provided by state news agencies Central China 
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Television and Xinhua (Goodspeed A1). In an uncharacteristic move, reporters ignored 
the directive and still filed and broadcast stories from the quake zone (Garnault and 
McDonald 1). Some television news stations, for example, even provided continuous 
coverage of the disaster (Fan A18). Although reporters ignored the directive, the 
instruction also functioned strategically to secure publicity for Premier Wen’s quake zone 
tour immediately after the quake. 
Chinese Web censors tacitly acknowledged their inability to keep pace with the 
speed of netizens’ online commentary, and the CCP abandoned most all attempts at 
online censorship. Instead, the central government chose to let media coverage of the 
premier’s tour shape public opinion (Goodspeed A1). This tactic initially worked in the 
central government’s favor, and prompted the propaganda department to issue the 
aforementioned directive calling for stories that promoted the “spirit of the central 
government” and its unifying force (Goodspeed A1). One Chinese blogger took to the 
Web posting a comment that equated Premier Wen’s tour of the quake zone to that of 
President George W. Bush’s visit to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina (Fowler and 
Dean 9). The People’s Daily newspaper printed an editorial just two days after the quake 
praising the state’s “open and effective news coverage” (Goodspeed A1).  
Despite this positive undercurrent, the fact remained that buildings surviving the 
earthquake were largely not those paid for with government funds. Thus the public’s 
suspicions of corrupt deals between education officials and contractors were born (York, 
“Beijing Can’t Muzzle” A1). These very suspicions prompted outrage in parents who lost 
children in the collapsed schools. Initially allowed to speak out, parents voiced their 
losses to whomever might listen – whether media or otherwise (Garnaut and McDonald 
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1). From the outset, netizens had commented online about this potential corruption. On 
the discussion site Tianya, one user posted on May 13, “How come it’s the schools that 
fall down first? Why are government offices so sturdy?” In response, another user wrote 
back, “Government (officials) think their flesh is more valuable. Many schools are built 
of little more than bean curd dregs – and who would dare to build a government office 
like that?” (“China Laments Collapsed Schools” 2). Microblogging site FanFou had 
equally critical comments posted to it. Visitors commented, “Why were most of those 
killed in the earthquake children?” and “How many donations will really reach the 
disaster area?” (Anna n.p.). Questions like these now spurred state censors back to their 
work of monitoring and removing inflammatory online posts (Anna n.p.). It is around this 
same timeframe that the Chinese Ministry of Public Security announced it had punished 
about 17 “rumor mongers” for online posting of  “sensational” messages about the 
earthquake (Fowler and Dean 9; Anna n.p.). Evidence exists that some comments 
criticizing local government’s disaster response disappeared entirely off the Tianya site 
(Anna n.p.). Similarly, a search on Chinese search engine Baidu of the keywords Sichuan 
and school did not yield any resulting news articles about parents’ reactions to the 
collapses or the loss of life (Olszewski n.p.) 
Had Baidu not blocked these keyword combinations, a list of news stories 
undoubtedly would have emerged. The Southern Weekend newspaper ran a series of 
investigative stories focusing on the poorly constructed schools demolished by the quake. 
The stories described the schools as “manmade disaster,” and quoted officials who were 
forthcoming about the complicity of local governments in erecting sub-standard 
structures (York, “Beijing Can’t Muzzle” A1). A business periodical, the Henan Shang 
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Bao, printed an article about a contractor who built a school for $40,000 in 1986. 
Although the building was listed as “dangerous,” the contractor found an inspector to 
pass it off as having no structural issues. Similarly, the Outlook Weekly newspaper 
reported on flimsy building materials like reinforcing rods capable of being bent easily by 
hand (York, “Beijing Can’t Muzzle” A1). Once government officials acknowledged 
potential corruption in the construction of schools, a Xinhua report answered to the 
allegations. The report blamed the elevated death toll not only on the possibility of weak 
infrastructure, but also argued that overcrowded schools simply would not have allowed 
for students to easily evacuate with enough time once the quake hit (Blanchard n.p.).  
Citizens’ outright questioning of shoddy school construction, along with parents’ 
vocal attempts at obtaining government accountability, prompted the central government 
to change course with regard to its initial transparency. If the week following the quake 
was characterized by openness, the weeks to come were marked by the state back-
pedaling on its promise of media accessibility (Guthrie n.p.). The CCP outlined a number 
of topics as off-limits for reporters, instead urging media to “report on the central 
government’s decision making and management of the earthquake aftermath” (Guthrie 
n.p.; Olszewski n.p.). The central government would also work to recalibrate its stance on 
media freedoms in anticipation of the more than 20,000 journalists working out of the 
Olympic Press Center in advance of the Beijing opening ceremonies (Guthrie n.p.). 
Reporters at the center encountered blocks on a multitude of websites to include those of 
Amnesty International, Radio FreeAsia, any sites related to Tibet and Taiwan and, for a 
time, the BBC website (Guthrie n.p.). By June’s arrival, and as parent protests cropped up 
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throughout the quake zone, the government would forbid any reporting about the 
organizing groups (Olszewski n.p.).  
Amid the formation of both netizen and state media messages, a number of 
individual activists gained notoriety for contributing to the online dialogue. Huang Qi, the 
founder of an established human rights website centered on Sichuan, was detained by 
state police on June 10 after leaving a restaurant in Chengdu. After his capture, Huang 
was held in a detention house and charged with “illegal possession of state secrets,” a 
charge typically leveled to quell dissent (Drew B6). The charge likely stemmed from 
Huang’s use of his website regarding the earthquake: He had allegedly collected 
information from parents about the collapsed schools with the eventual aim of exposing 
related government corruption (Drew B6; “China Arrests Activists” n.p.). Huang then 
penned and posted articles to his website outlining the schools’ structural problems 
(Hooker A10). 
Retired school teacher Zeng Hongling inadvertently found herself at the heart of 
government attention after a friend posted private writings of Zeng’s online (Hooker 
A10; “Woman Held after Posting” n.p.). Observing the quake aftermath in Mianyang, 
Zeng wrote three essays and sent them from her home computer to a friend. The friend, in 
turn, posted these personal accounts about the quake zone online. Eventually, the essays 
with titles like “My Personal Experience in the Earthquake” and “Earthquake Relief 
Efforts Fully Reveal the True Face of Party Officials,” were posted to 
ObserveChina.com, a Chinese-language site hosted in the United States (“Woman Held 
after Posting” n.p.). On June 17, plainclothes officers arrested Zeng in Chengdu, and 
charged her with “inciting subversion” (Hooker A10).  
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 On June 25, Liu Shaokun, a Sichuan Province school employee, was detained at 
Guanghan Middle School for allegedly posting photographs of collapsed schools online 
(Fairclough A7). Liu was detained for “inciting people to illegally petition the 
government and for seriously disrupting social order” (Hooker A10). News reports 
indicated that Liu had travelled throughout the quake zone with the intent of organizing 
parent protests, and taking photos to post online (Fairclough A7). By July 31, state police 
sentenced Liu to a labor camp for one year, charging him with “re-education through 
labor” for “disseminating rumours and destroying social order” (Hooker A10). Again, 
this type of punishment is commonly designed to quiet anti-government activity, and 
subsequently does not require a formal charge or trial (Gee A17). 
While these activists’ voices centered on poorly built schools, the blog of artist 
and architect Ai Weiwei also contributed to further dialogue of dissent. Invited to 
contribute to the website Sina.com as a blogger, Ai had established a Web presence on 
the site since October 2005 (Ambrozy xxi). Taken by the Web platform’s reach and 
immediacy, Ai utilized his blog to showcase not only his artistic expression but also 
comment on politically sensitive matters in China (Ambrozy xxii). Inevitably among 
those topics in May 2008 was the Sichuan earthquake and criticism of the government’s 
disregard for accountability and the loss of young lives. Ambrozy points out that while 
online dissent about this topic was already roiling, it was Ai who through his blog was 
the “most direct” in commenting (xxiii).  
Ten days after the quake, in a blog entry entitled Grief, Ai wrote, “Before we let 
murky tears cloud our already unclear vision, we need to face up to the way the world 
works. The true misfortune of the dead lies in the unconsciousness and apathy of the 
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living, in the ignorance of the value of life by those who simply float through it, in our 
numbness toward the right to survival and expression, in our distortions of justice, 
equality, and freedom” (150). On June 21, Ai wrote again about the earthquake, this time 
mocking the Department of Education’s shirking off of responsibility and commenting on 
the Chinese media’s message of unavoidable death in disaster. In this entry entitled 
Forget About It, he wrote, “No need to reflect on this or to suspect why it might be so, for 
misery has long been an endless spiritual resource in ‘regenerating the nation.’ … For 
years, deaths on such a vast and mighty scale have created ‘fortunate ghosts.’ At least 
they will never have to experience another startling death” (Ai 157).  
Blog entries like these garnered Ai much attention, and as he and a group of 
volunteers rallied across the quake zone to gather more information from parents about 
their deceased children, his blog eventually became too great a threat (Ambrozy xxiii-
xxiv). Deletions from his blog by the site host became more commonplace (Ambrozy 
xxiii). After authorities monitored Ai by way of telephone, text, video surveillance and 
firsthand harassment, Ai’s blog was eventually closed on May 28, 2009 (Ambrozy xxiii-
xxiv).  
CONSTRUCTION OF NETWORKS & ORGANIZATIONS 
 One of the first reported mentions of a mass gathering of organizing parents came 
about on May 27, with media coverage garnering attention more so for its accompanying 
imagery. On this day in Mianzhu about 200 parents gathered at the site of a collapsed 
school and angrily confronted a local official. The Mianzhu city secretary pleaded with 
the parents to “trust his government to handle the investigation” (Oster A15). The photo 
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was snapped as the city secretary begged the gathered parents not to follow through with 
their threats of elevating their complaints to a higher level of government, according to 
one parent in attendance that day. The photograph, published by the Southern Metropolis 
Daily, sparked much online discussion once it was published and re-posted to websites 
(Oster A15).  
 Children’s Day in China, celebrated on June 1, also saw an outcropping of 
organized protests throughout the entire quake zone. In Mianzhu, parents gathered at a 
school yard to stage a sit-in. Parents convened at a school in the town of Wufu and 
shouted slogans about corrupt politicians. In Juyuan, gathered parents were dispersed by 
soldiers who then sealed off the grounds of a middle school to search for bodies. And in 
Dujiangyan, 600 people gathered at Xinjian Primary School wearing white t-shirts that 
read, “We Firmly Ask for Justice for the Dead Students,” in red lettering. The other side 
of the shirts read, “Severely Punish the Corruption in the Tofu Construction” (Jacobs, 
“Child’s Day without the Children” 4). 
 Ai Weiwei’s blog also played a role in real-time organizing when he and a group 
of volunteers formed Citizen Investigation. Using his blog to invite others, Ai united with 
about 100 volunteers with the express aim of putting “pressure [on] the Sichuan 
provincial government to take responsibility for the shoddy quality of the school 
buildings that had collapsed” (Ambrozy xxiii). Together, the group conducted interviews 
with families, officials and workers to compile information and generate an accurate list 
of the names of students killed. This list flew in the face of government officials who 
claimed an accurate student death count already existed, despite their inability at the time 
to provide the count’s source or authenticity.  
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The team’s investigative work on generating this list shed abundant light on the 
situation, and produced a wealth of even more threatening anti-government information. 
Transcripts of volunteers’ interviews were posted to the blog, only to later be removed by 
censors. Video footage of Citizen Investigation’s work in the quake zone was eventually 
edited into a documentary distributed via Twitter. According to Ambrozy, the team’s 
work “produced a list of names, with the date of birth, school, grade and a 
parent/guardian contact number for more than five thousand children (the listed 
numbered 5,210 in August 2010)” (xxiii). As previously mentioned above, Ai’s blog, and 
a great deal of this content, ceased to exist as of May 2009. Although Ai and the Citizen 
Investigation volunteers met with surveillance and harassment by the state, their work 
continued via alternate online channels like Twitter and volunteers’ blogs hosted on 
overseas platforms. Tensions further came to a fore in August 2009 when Ai and a group 
of activists travelled to Chengdu in an attempt to testify in court on behalf of a detained 
volunteer (Ambrozy xxiv). On August 12, police broke into Ai’s hotel room at 3 a.m. and 
a struggle ensued, resulting in Ai sustaining serious head injuries that would eventually 
require his undergoing surgery for a cerebral hemorrhage (Ambrozy xxv).  
 Table 2.1 offers a summation of each Chinese incident’s three corresponding 
descriptive sections. Each incident is thus outlined here first by its characteristic agent 
interaction, which also develops to form the focus of eventual network formation. This is 
then followed by the state’s media message, citizen/netizen message and, finally, the 
scenario’s outcome. This framework will be applied both here in Chapter 2 and in 
Chapter 3, and will set the stage for the comparative analysis in Chapter 4 of all incidents 
presented. 
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Incident 
Agent 
Interaction/ 
Focus of 
Network 
Formation 
Media 
Message 
Citizen/Netizen 
Message 
Outcome 
Deng 
Yujiao, 
2009 
Single Individual 
vs. 
Local Officials 
Victim 
Blaming 
Abuse of Power/ 
Government 
Corruption 
Victim 
Acquittal/ 
Reduced 
Charges 
Sanlu 
Milk, 
2008 
Multiple 
Citizens/Families 
vs. 
State/Business 
Scapegoating 
of Business 
Middlemen 
Government 
Corruption in 
Business 
Business 
Accountability 
& Re-evaluation 
of State Food 
Safety System 
Collapsed 
Schools 
of 
Sichuan 
Quake, 
2008 
Multiple 
Citizens/Families 
vs. 
Local & State 
Officials 
‘Unavoidable’ 
Natural 
Disaster 
Government 
Corruption in 
Infrastructure 
Scant 
acknowledgment 
by state 
Table 2.1 Framework for Chinese Incidents 
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III. EGYPT 
 
This research now turns away from China and toward three incidents that took 
place in Egypt during roughly the same time frame. For the purposes of highlighting the 
foundational importance of a specific group’s use of the Internet, the first incident 
presented in this chapter reaches back to the year 2005. Much like Chapter 2, this chapter 
uses as a guide the framework that highlights characteristic agent interaction, which 
proceeds to become the focus of eventual network formation. This is then followed by the 
state’s media message, citizen/netizen message and, finally, the scenario’s outcome.  
GROUPS VS. STATE: MAY 25 REFERENDUM VOTE, 2005 
 On May 10, 2005, the Egyptian parliament announced its majority endorsement 
of an amendment to Article 76 of the constitution (“Egypt Parliament Approves” n.p.). 
The amendment would allow for the first time since the 1950s, the inclusion of more than 
one candidate on the ballot for the presidential election (Wright n.p.). However, a read of 
the article’s revision by opposition party members quickly revealed its paradox: the new 
requirements called for independent candidates to “win support from at least 65 of the 
444 elected members of the lower house of parliament, 90 percent of whom are from 
Mubarak’s party” (“Egypt Constitution Referendum” n.p.). This parliamentary approval 
of Article 76’s revisions would make way for Egyptian citizens to take part in a 
referendum vote later in the month (“Egypt Parliament Approves” n.p.).
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Noting the improbability of an independent’s run, opposition group Kefaya 
immediately called for a boycott of the referendum vote slated for May 25 (Wright n.p.; 
“Egypt Constitution Referendum” n.p.). Kefaya, Arabic for enough, had established itself 
in 2004, and since December of that year had begun staging demonstrations against 
Mubarak’s rule (Lesch 33; Khan n.p.). The group’s cause was clear -- members had 
reached their threshold in dealing with the regime and opposed the predicted “dynastic 
succession” of Gamal Mubarak following his father’s tenure (Lesch 33; El Hennawy and 
Fattah n.p.). Kefaya’s overt opposition, in combination with the voices of other anti-
government groups, signaled the first time in 23 years that Mubarak’s rule was so openly 
challenged (Khan n.p.). 
Kefaya maintained a significant role in this time frame for two different reasons. 
First, it was the first organization to consolidate what Lynch refers to as a “range of 
ideologies with revolutionary socialists protesting side by side with Muslim Brothers, and 
liberals with Nasserists” (46). The group did not hold tightly to political parties or 
professional unions, nor did it represent a single religious viewpoint, thus allowing for a 
broader membership base (Aboubakr 256). Additionally, Kefaya was the earliest of 
opposition groups in Egypt to have adopted Internet-based communication technologies 
to mobilize its membership (Lynch 46; Williams n.p.).  
With the referendum vote now scheduled and Kefaya firm in its stance against it, 
the days leading up to the vote reflected a succession of other opposition groups joining 
forces with Kefaya. For example, at a meeting of judges in Cairo on May 13, the judges 
decided collectively to refuse oversight of the presidential election slated for September. 
Without the judges’ presence, the vote would effectively be rendered invalid (Fattah 
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n.p.). On May 17, four more opposition groups – the Muslim Brotherhood, Wafd, 
Tagammu and the Nasserists – sided with Kefaya in recommending the boycott of the 
referendum vote (Wright n.p.). By May 21, the opposition force grew further with the 
addition of the al-Ghad party also boycotting the referendum (“Egyptian Ghad Party” 
n.p.).  
 Amid this growing opposition, on May 24 President Mubarak gave a televised 
speech urging Egyptians to take part in the referendum vote. In it, he said, “I have full 
and unlimited confidence that you will turn out to take part, through the referendum, in 
making a new tomorrow for our country and exploring new and broad horizons in our 
political life” (Wright n.p.). On May 25, Kefaya and other opposition groups gathered in 
Cairo to protest the vote, where they were met at the Journalists’ Syndicate by a National 
Democratic Party (NDP) rally and Egyptian riot police (“Egypt Police Crack Down” 
n.p.). Violence ensued when riot police provided “protected” oversight of NDP 
supporters as they took turns brutally beating opposition protestors. On this day, 
numerous Kefaya members are beaten, and 10 are arrested (“Egypt Police Crack Down” 
n.p.). A number of women protestors, some journalists, were also beaten and sexually 
assaulted (“Egypt Backs Election” n.p.). 
 One day after the vote, the Egyptian government announced that 83 percent of 
voters backed the referendum, with voter participation reaching 53 percent (“Egypt Backs 
Election” n.p.). Reuters reports an inconsistency noted on the day of the referendum: 
While polling station officials said that 50 to 80 percent of voters had turned out two to 
three hours before they closed, the news services’ correspondents failed to witness any 
long lines of voters gathered during this same time frame (Abdellah n.p.). Opposition 
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parties, on the other hand, claimed that officials inflated the turnout numbers to bring 
legitimacy to the vote (“Claims of U.S. Backing” n.p.). 
 Kefaya and other opposition groups, meanwhile, accused the NDP of intimidating 
the protestors gathered on voting day, with Kefaya specifically accusing NDP members 
at the rally of having “molested women colleagues” (“Egypt Backs Election” n.p.). This 
starts a succession of third-party commentary about the protests and the state’s excessive 
use of force against the demonstrators. May 26 also found U.S. President George W. 
Bush condemning the attacks, and calling for “international observers to oversee the 
forthcoming [presidential] elections in Egypt” (“Bush Criticizes Attacks” n.p.; “Egypt’s 
Government” n.p.). Later that same day White House spokesman Scott McClellan stated 
plainly that, “There is no excuse for attacks on peaceful demonstrators. Anyone who 
attacks peaceful demonstrators must be arrested and tried, that’s our view” (“Bush 
Criticizes Attacks” n.p.). The Egyptian government, however, offered no comment on the 
brutality shown toward the protestors (El Hennawy and Fattah n.p.). Days later, the NDP 
minimizes the actions at the May 25 protest, referring to the brutality as simply 
“emotional tension” (“Egyptian Women Demand” n.p.). Human Rights Watch released a 
statement on May 27 that echoed the sentiment of the White House. In it, the group urged 
Mubarak to launch an investigation into the brutality carried out May 25. “At a 
minimum,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East director of HRW, “the president should 
appoint people with unquestioned integrity to investigate this state-sanctioned brutality” 
(“U.S. Rights Watchdog” n.p.).  
In the short term, the NDP’s handling of the referendum served as a portent of the 
forthcoming presidential election. In September, Mubarak was re-elected for a fifth term. 
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With Kefaya’s message of “enough” now seemingly less relevant, its multiple loose 
affiliations, an attribute that once made it more challenging for the Egyptian government 
to topple, now contributed to its decline. Though Kefaya continued to exist in the coming 
years, it did so in a much more minimized capacity (Singerman17-18).  
FORMATION OF THE MEDIA MESSAGE 
 The May 25 referendum vote evoked from the state a media message of 
patriotism as it called for democratic reform. First evidence of this is seen when the 
Egyptian parliament approved the revision of Article 76. Parliament speaker Fathi Surur, 
in announcing the majority vote, stated that the referendum would pave the way for an 
“era of democracy and liberalism” (“Egypt Parliament Approves” n.p.). This notion was 
reiterated once more with the broadcast of Mubarak’s speech on state television 
entreating citizens to participate in the referendum vote, calling it “a decisive moment in 
our contemporary history” (Wright, “Mubarak Asks” n.p.). Advertisements placed in 
print publications and on state TV stations further supported the president’s call for 
citizens to vote. With NDP publicity for the vote at its height, equally noteworthy was the 
absence of advertising in the name of opposition candidates. This fact pointed back to the 
NDP’s control of the media, as opposition parties had few forums by which to announce 
candidacy or advertise initiatives to a majority population (Wright, “Mubarak Asks” 
n.p.). On May 25, state television deliberately shaped its news coverage of the vote when 
TV stations aired footage of Egyptian ministers voting at polling locations and conducted 
interviews with NDP supporters who, following the states cues, referred to the vote as a 
“landmark for democracy” (“Egypt Police Crack Down” n.p.). When the government 
announced the referendum’s results and voter turnout rates the following day, the state 
58 
 
seized yet another opportunity to reinforce citizens’ patriotism when Interior Minister 
Habib al-Adli “hailed the 53 percent of the country’s 32.5 million voters who cast their 
ballots … as having ‘expressed themselves freely and displayed their patriotism’” 
(“Egypt Backs Election Change” n.p.).  
 Kefaya activists, meanwhile, held firmly to the message conveyed by the 
translation of the group’s name. Kefaya member’s patience with the Mubarak regime had 
run its course (Singerman 16), and the group’s actions leading up to the referendum vote 
aimed to chip away at the NDP’s façade of patriotic reform. On May 10, when 
parliament’s approval of the article’s revision was announced, the opposition noted 
immediately the unrealistic requisites levied upon non-NDP candidates. Kefaya declared 
in that moment its establishment of a “campaign of civil disobedience” and proclaimed 
its boycott on the referendum (“Egypt Parliament Approves” n.p.). In stories appearing in 
this time period, Kefaya members used the words “sham,” “farce,” and “phony” to 
describe the vote (Egypt Parliament Approves” n.p.; “Egypt Police Crack Down” n.p.; El 
Hennawy and Fattah 9). And, immediately following voting day, Kefaya spokesman 
Abdel Halim Qandeel said in an interview with The New York Times that, “This was not a 
referendum, but an extension of Mubarak’s rule and a guarantee that Gamal will inherit 
from him. We refuse for the people of Egypt to be insulted like this” (El Hennawy and 
Fattah 9). Having already organized a series of demonstrations reaching back to 
December 2004, Kefaya activists were also equipped with a number of chants equally 
disparaging of the regime (Khan n.p.) This paved the way for slogans like, “Tell Mubarak 
the coward: enough is enough,” and, “No to another mandate, no dictatorship and 
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arbitrary policies,” to come into use at the May 25 demonstration (“Egypt Police Crack 
Down” n.p.).  
CONSTRUCTION OF NETWORKS & ORGANIZATIONS 
 Kefaya protestors, along with other opposition party members, gathered on May 
25 outside the Journalists’ Syndicate in Cairo to rally against the referendum vote they 
had started boycotting weeks prior (“Egypt Police Crack Down” n.p.). Two other factions 
also in attendance that day clashed with opposition group members: Egyptian riot police 
and NDP supporters who had gathered to buoy Mubarak’s presidency (Abdellah n.p.; 
“Egypt Police Crack Down” n.p.). What began as a non-violent gathering that day 
quickly led to police’s use of clubs and sticks to quiet the opposition protestors in Cairo. 
Some eyewitnesses that day reported protestors leaving with bloodied mouths (“Egypt 
Police Crack Down” n.p.) One Kefaya protestor found himself surrounded by riot police 
before being beaten, while others were physically dragged away and then beaten 
(Abdellah n.p.). Protests were also reported to have taken place on this date in Ismailya, 
Port Said and Al-Arish, with 46 arrested in Ismailya (“Egypt Police Crack Down” n.p.; 
Abdellah n.p.). In the day following the protest, Kefaya released a statement saying that, 
“They [the NDP] unleashed thugs, pickpockets and criminals that were waiving posters 
of the president in one hand and sticks, knifes and stones in the other” (“Egypt Backs 
Election” n.p.). Judges, who had earlier in the month renounced oversight of the 
presidential vote, were largely absent from polling locations that day too (“Egypt Backs 
Election” n.p.). By doing this, the judges’ boycott effectively “crush[ed] any attempt to 
brand the polls as free and fair” (El Hennawy and Fattah n.p.).  
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 The police brutality of this Black Wednesday demonstration, as it came to be 
called, transcended previous norms, however, as it also included the beating and sexual 
assault of a number of women protestors. News reports included the eyewitness account 
of a 19- or 20-year-old woman being dragged on the ground, and then beaten by riot 
police with batons. Mubarak supporters are said to have “groped three women journalists, 
tearing clothes and pulling the headscarf off one” (Abdellah n.p.). In an interview with 
Agence France Presse, Egyptian journalist Iman Taha recounted her brutality at the 
hands of NDP supporters who, essentially supervised by riot police, shoved her against a 
wall and kicked her twice above the waist. Her assailants continued beating her long after 
she fell onto the floor, and told her that, “Your cries won’t help, you should not have 
come here in the first place. That’ll teach you [a] lesson for demonstrating” (“Egyptian 
Journalist” n.p.). Another Egyptian journalist told Human Rights Watch that a “gang of 
20 or 30 NDP guys” lunged at her, with one groping her. A male shouted out, seemingly 
as a signal to others, “I have a lady, let her through.” That’s when the others began 
pulling her hair, ripping her shirt and touching her everywhere. The woman said that 
following this, the men began kicking her and groping her again while “laughing and 
cheering” (“US Rights Watchdog” n.p.). These attacks on women were regarded as 
especially reprehensible within the nation’s “conservative Islamic society,” and, in the 
short term, spurred women to organize initiatives protesting the brutal assaults (Slackman 
and el-Naggar, “Assault on Women” 1; “Egyptian Women Demand” n.p.). The attacks 
also further unified Kefaya with other opposition groups, as all agreed the brutality was 
yet another sign of Mubarak’s corrupt rule (Slackman and el-Naggar, “Assault on 
Women” 1).  
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 As previously noted, Kefaya is considered a forerunner for its innovative use of 
Web technologies. Although reference to precise uses of these technologies as they relate 
specifically to the May 25 referendum protest is scarce, evidence of their general usage 
by Kefaya may best recount here how they aided in organizing on this day. Kefaya was 
comprised of founders largely described as “older leadership” (Onodera 50). But as 
university students and young professionals joined the opposition cause, Youth for 
Change emerged as an independent group operating under the Kefaya organizational 
umbrella (Onodera 49). More well-versed with Internet technologies and focused on 
forging largely “interpersonal networks,” Youth for Change communicated among its 
members using e-mails and blogs. It also mobilized protests quickly by sending text 
messages and building e-mail distribution lists (Onodera 50). Kefaya circumnavigated 
content restrictions in newspapers by placing ads on websites, instead (Oweidat et al. 21 
). To further get its message out, Kefaya created Web banners, and even political 
cartoons that were placed both on its Website and on blogs that regularly worked with the 
group (Onodera 50; Oweidat et al. 21). Kefaya also exploited the posting of imagery and 
video footage online, exposing the Egyptian public to issues of police brutality and sexual 
assault at the hands of state police (Onodera 50; Oweidat et al. 21-22).  Gunning and 
Baron note that visual imagery of corruption struck a significant chord, as it allowed 
Egyptian people to go online and be an eyewitness to these acts (57). According to 
Onodera, use of these technologies “proved to be important tools in organizing popular 
opposition to the NDP and President Mubarak in the summer of 2005” (50). Kefaya’s 
Web presence had begun simply with a site allowing for unrestricted membership and an 
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online forum for citizen’s grievances, and obviously grew quickly to encompass a variety 
of uses (Oweidat et al.xx; Gunning and Baron 57; Onodera 50).  
Another facet of Kefaya’s Internet strategy was its well-developed relationships 
with a number of bloggers (Oweidat et al. 23). The group cultivated a community of 
bloggers during this time frame that mirrored the political grievances of Youth for 
Change (Gunning and Baron 57). While some bloggers were Kefaya members, others 
were simply individuals who used their blogs as a platform to voice opposition against 
Mubarak’s rule (Oweidat et al. 23). With a common purpose in mind, Kefaya placed the 
banners of individual bloggers on its website, while bloggers carried the Kefaya logo on 
their sites. Bloggers also re-enforced Kefaya’s maintaining an online record of human 
rights abuses by posting the same video and photos for its blog visitors (Oweidat et al. 
23). And in 2005, blog Misr Digital became Kefaya’s “online source for information” 
(Korany 266). By 2006, a year after Mubarak’s re-election, this community of bloggers 
linked to Kefaya worked also to support labor issues. In an interview with Ahmed Maher, 
at this time a Youth for Change member, he said that blogs began making efforts to 
“show that the problem lay with the regime rather than the factories and thus was 
political” (Gunning and Baron 63). 
MULTIPLE INDIVIDUALS VS. STATE OFFICIALS: MAHALLA TEXTILE 
WORKERS’ STRIKE, 2008 
In early March 2008 discontent arose once more among textile workers at the 
state-owned Misr Company for Spinning and Weaving in Mahalla al-Kobra, about 60 
miles north of Cairo (Gamal n.p.). Located in the nation’s textile hub, the company 
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employed about 250,000 workers who struggled financially amid Egypt’s rising 
economic inflation and their stagnating salaries (Morrow and Moussa al-Omrani, 
“Protests Over High” n.p.). The workers’ lagging salaries had not been commensurate 
with the ballooning prices of bread and cooking oil, basic staples for survival (Slackman 
and el-Naggar 6). Frustrated with these circumstances, the textile workers planned an 
April 6, 2008, strike to demand higher wages and protest against high food costs (“Fresh 
Clashes” n.p.). These Mahalla employees already had a history of organizing around 
grievances, and the date of April 6 was chosen to commemorate the anniversary of a 
strike held on the same date in 2006 (Soliman 60).  
Around this same time, 27-year-old Ahmed Maher heard murmurs of the textile 
workers’ planned strike in April. The Cairo-based civil engineer and activist joined his 
friend Esra Abdel-Fattah on March 23 to create a Facebook group supporting the effort 
(Wolman n.p.). By doing so, Maher and Abdel-Fattah aimed to gain membership and 
increase awareness of the protests beyond Mahalla. They named the group ‘April 6: A 
Nationwide Strike’ (Morrow and Moussa al-Omrani, “Protests Over High” n.p.), and, 
through Facebook, sent out about 300 invitations calling on others to join the cause 
(Wolman n.p.). By the following day, the group had gained 3,000 new members, and, by 
March 31, its membership grew to 40,000 (Wolman n.p.). Although page administrators 
communicated with followers primarily online, members also worked offline to gain 
further support for Cairo-based organizing. The April 6 Youth, as the group called itself, 
shared its own plans for protest efforts via TV ads in the form of news tickers and 
scribbled information on paper banners and money (Knickmeyer A1; Wolman n.p.). 
Small bills were specifically chosen to relay messages, as the group determined these 
64 
 
denominations would circulate through more of the poor’s hands than others 
(Knickmeyer A1). By April 5, just one day before the scheduled strike, the Facebook 
group had reached a total of 60,000 members (Morrow and Moussa al-Omrani, “Protests 
Over High” n.p.).  
Originally, textile workers at the Misr Company in Mahalla had planned to strike 
at their work day’s end on April 6 (“Fresh Clashes” n.p.). However, a number of factors 
transpired that would ultimately cause a departure from this original strategy. Company 
officials floated the idea on April 5 that employees’ salaries might be increased, and labor 
leaders responded readily by calling off protest plans. On that same day before the 
scheduled strike, the Egyptian government deployed extra police to Mahalla to maintain a 
presence and good order (Morrow and Moussa al-Omrani, “Protests Over High” n.p.). To 
further reinforce its low tolerance for protestors, the Egyptian Interior Ministry released a 
statement “warning of ‘immediate and firm measures’ against perceived attempts to 
‘demonstrate, disrupt road traffic or the running of public establishments.’” The ministry 
also outlined the expectation that all businesses should plan on staying open for the 
duration of the work day (Morrow and Moussa al-Omrani, “Protests Over High” n.p.). 
Despite some textile workers’ cancellation of the strike and a heightened police 
presence, thousands in Mahalla still gathered on April 6 at the end of their workday. 
Citizens chanted, “Enough, it’s too much,” and gathered to throw stones at police (“Fresh 
Clashes” n.p.; Slackman and el-Naggar 6). Police returned fire by launching tear gas at 
protestors (Slackman and el-Naggar 6). The strike in Mahalla eventually gave way to two 
days of rioting that left three dead, hundreds injured and between 450 and 600 detained 
for inciting violence (Morrow and Moussa al-Omrani, “Activists Plan General Strike” 
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n.p.). Damage left from the riots included burned cars, several schools and more than 10 
businesses (“Fresh Clashes” n.p.). In another show of anger, some rioters pulled down 
and destroyed large posters of President Mubarak’s likeness that had been hanging in the 
town’s square (Morrow and Moussa al-Omrani, “Protests Over High” n.p.). 
Meanwhile in Cairo, the high police concentration was enough to deter most 
protestors from gathering in city streets (“Fresh Clashes” n.p.). Although the New York 
Times reported that three Cairo universities saw student protests, city streets remained 
largely empty with a number of stores shuttered. While police presence in Tahrir Square 
stopped protestors from gathering there, 100 members of a lawyers’ syndicate still 
gathered on a building’s rooftop and chanted, “Down, down with Hosni Mubarak” 
(Slackman and el-Naggar 6). Eventually, police broke up the group. To some, the lack of 
protestors on Cairo streets signaled a failure in organizing nationwide protest efforts; to 
others, the silent streets demonstrated heeding the word of organizers who had called for 
citizens to stay home this day (Morrow and Moussa al-Omrani, “Activists Plan General 
Strike” n.p.). It was also in Cairo on April 6 that Abdel-Fattah, one of the Facebook 
group’s administrators, was arrested by police while meeting with friends at a café 
(Wolman n.p.). By around this date the Facebook group she had helped create now had 
about 70,000 members (Richter 20). 
Almost a month after the strikes, Mubarak announced on April 30 an increase of 
public sector workers’ salaries by 30 percent (Michael n.p.). This measure, whose 
specifications for implementation were not outlined, would aid about 6 million Egyptian 
workers (Nasrawi 13). Prior to this announcement, government officials had in the 
interim tried to quell Mahalla workers’ dissent with a number of incentives. For example, 
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two days into the Mahalla riots, Egypt’s prime minister along with four others, visited 
workers at the mill “offering bonuses and more investment in the town’s giant factory to 
placate workers angry over high prices” (Gamal n.p.). In exchange for not taking part in 
protests, the ministers had promised workers a bonus of 30 days’ pay, a doubling of bread 
subsidies and improved medical care at work (Gamal n.p.). But less than one week after 
Mubarak’s announcing salary increases, the Egyptian parliament passed a bill on May 5 
that would effectively raise taxes and increase prices on a number of daily necessities. 
The result was a 40 to 50 percent increase in the cost of gasoline and diesel, used for 
public transportation; a 58 percent increase in natural gas, used for cooking and by 
factories; and, a 10 percent increase in the price of cigarettes (Nasrawi 13). The salary 
increase in conjunction with the bill’s price hikes was summarized best by Saad al-
Katatni, a member of the Egyptian parliament. He described the passing of the bill by 
saying, “They are taking in their right hand what they are giving in their left hand” 
(Nasrawi 13).  
FORMATION OF THE MEDIA MESSAGE 
 Assessing state news coverage of the April 6 Mahalla strike presents a unique 
challenge here in that minimal reporting of the event exists in the Egyptian press. This is 
attributed largely to a well-recognized epoch of repression of free speech and on 
journalists’ accessibility to news events (“Crackdown on Free” n.p.). Thus, outlined 
briefly here instead will be documented acts of repression taken against reporting of the 
strikes, and the little notable evidence of state reaction reported in the media about the 
protest. The latter will serve to construct, albeit loosely, this research’s conception of the 
state media message.  
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 Although the state did not issue a directive banning press coverage of the strike, it 
did censor images and video footage that had the potential to appear in Egyptian media 
(Wolman n.p.). This need to stop the flow of information about the riots is further 
supported by the state’s actions as they occurred at the protest site in Mahalla. Among the 
first mention of journalists’ repression came a mere day after the riot’s start, when 
American freelance journalist James Buck, along with his Egyptian translator, were 
detained after Buck took photos of families participating in a hunger strike (Michael n.p.; 
“Photographers Arrested” n.p.). This sweep also saw the arrest and detainment of nine 
other Egyptian cameramen and photographers covering the riot, including one working 
for Reuters news service (Michael n.p.). Although Buck was released after one day’s 
detainment, he chose to stay at the police station where his translator remained in police 
custody (“Photographers Arrested” n.p.). The camera card containing Buck’s photos was 
confiscated by the Egyptian police (Michael n.p.).  
 In a separate incident at the site of the protests, security officials detained a 
reporter from independent Egyptian weekly paper El Fagr and two television journalists. 
This time the arrests stemmed from the journalists’ attempt to cover a meeting between 
demonstrators and a group of professors and activists who wished to “express solidarity” 
with Mahalla residents (“Photographers Arrested” n.p.). This visiting group, however, 
never made it to the protest site, as their vehicles were surrounded by about 100 plain-
clothes police at a security checkpoint (“Photographers Arrested” n.p.). Similarly, three 
satellite television stations were “blacked out” by the state’s satellite company, allegedly 
at the request of the United States, for broadcasting images of the protest (Olszewski n.p.; 
“Crackdown on Free” n.p.). By fall of 2008, an Egyptian court had fined the Cairo News 
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Company for “operating without a license … after the firm aired shots of protesters 
stamping on a picture of the country’s president” and re-broadcast those images to its 
network of stations (Olszewski n.p.). It’s also during this period that both administrators 
of the April 6 Facebook page are arrested, though on separate dates, for their online 
activism (Knickmeyer A1). These detainments will be explained in greater detail in this 
chapter’s next section. 
 The few stories about the Mahalla strike crafted by the state-run press were 
characterized by journalists and activists as unfair in their assessment of protestors’ 
motivations. Demonstrators were depicted as “saboteurs,” who were therefore deserving 
of the security police’s forceful, and at times deadly, reciprocal actions (“Crackdown on 
Free” n.p.). Menassat.com reported the staging of injuries by police at the protest site for 
the explicit purpose of presenting to journalists a scenario in which police could “pose as 
victims of mob violence” (“Crackdown on Free” n.p.). In the Egyptian Interior Ministry’s 
statement released one day ahead of the strike, it referred to potential participants as 
“provocateurs” supporting “illegal movements” that worked against the “interests of the 
Egyptian people” (Morrow and Moussa al-Omrani, “Protest Over High” n.p.). The 
second day of the Mahalla strike brought with it the visit of Egypt’s prosecutor general, 
who had come expressly to assess the riot’s resulting damage. In an interview there with 
a state-run television station, the prosecutor general echoed once more the message of 
citizens as instigators, saying that, “There are people who want to exploit this matter 
[prices] for political reasons and ambitions and in a cheap and stupid way” (“Fresh 
Clashes” n.p.). As can be seen here, the state created a narrative that dismissed citizens’ 
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economic woes, and instead focused on a message of citizens as initiators of illegal, 
unpatriotic activities (Richter 21). 
 While state censors contained as much imagery of the April 6 strike as possible 
from the public, bloggers and April 6 group members capitalized on the opportunity to 
post them online (Wolman n.p.). Just as the formation of the state’s media message 
differs here than in other cases, so too does that of the April 6 Youth. Without sustained 
coverage of the riots in the press, this essentially allowed for the activist group to create 
an uninterrupted active versus incrementally reactive message. As such, the group 
maintained its narrative of opposing the climate of corruption by way of social and 
economic issues, and used it as grounds for organizing protest nationwide. As Morrow 
and Moussa al-Omrani report, protest leaders took to the Internet to ask that people 
“register their dissatisfaction with the political and economic status quo by either staying 
at home or by staging protest marches throughout the country” (“Activists Plan General” 
n.p.). An Associated Press account leading up the April 6 Mahalla strike similarly 
indicates that the planned protest was the “first major attempt by opposition groups to 
turn the past year’s labor unrest into a wider political protest against the government of 
President Hosni Mubarak” (Schemm n.p.). April 6 Youth’s cause solidified social and 
economic discontent in the hands of youth and in conjunction with the textile workers’ 
strike (Richter 20; Saleh 480). According to Sika, “The April 6 movement … fram[ed] its 
solidarity with the al-Mahalla textile workers with the ideals of social justice, equality of 
opportunity, and human dignity that lie at the root of both political and economic 
demands” (77). 
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In the run up to April 6, members of the Facebook group started changing their 
profile photos to that of the April 6 Youth logo. This contributed to a sustained digital 
presence, as all members of the group repeatedly set eyes on the same image each time 
they would log in to Facebook (Wolman n.p.). Group members would also individually 
post links back to the April 6 Youth group’s page, another way of continuously keeping 
at a fore the presence of the group to online members and beyond (Wolman n.p.). As the 
group grew in membership, it did manage to become the subject of few print articles and 
even influenced the discussion topics in television programming (“The Power of 
Facebook” n.p.). On the morning of April 6, Abdel-Fattah posted to Facebook a missive 
perhaps designed to inspire the day’s protest. In this post, she specified the protest would 
be against “oppression and corruption” and then proceeded to list demands the public 
either needed in everyday life or should reject as part of the protest date. The list included 
such items as “No work, No selling, We need Just Judiciary, We need Enough Salaries, 
We need Work, No Thug Policemen, No Price Hikes, No Torture in Police Stations, No 
Bribes, No Detentions” (“Crossing Red Lines” G6).  
CONSTRUCTION OF NETWORKS & ORGANIZATIONS 
 Even though this group’s ability to organize effectively on Cairo streets has been 
called into question, April 6 Youth organizers nevertheless took deliberate actions – both 
online and offline – to further the group’s goal of spurring the Egyptian people out of 
political apathy (Saleh 480). Group founder Maher described April 6 Youth’s effort by 
saying, “Our main job is that the people have awareness of their rights and know how to 
break their handcuffs and remove their shackles” (Knickermeyer A1). Among the first 
demonstrative steps of employing the group’s strategy was the collaborative effort of 
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Maher and Abdel-Fattah in simply creating the ‘April 6: A Nationwide Strike’ Facebook 
group. Capitalizing on Facebook’s inherent interactivity and formation of loose networks, 
the digital platform served to unite members in an “alternative” space where anti-
government discussion could openly take place (Fam n.p.; Shehata 119). In a May 2008 
interview with the Wall Street Journal,  Maher equated April 6 Youth’s online presence 
to a virtual, 24-hour-a-day meeting where members could “see how other people are 
living, and … reject many government policies” (Fam n.p.). 
 This sustained “meeting” via Facebook would give way to real-time meetings, 
too. As the April 6 Youth amassed online membership, the group’s organizers 
transitioned a number of its activities offline. While group members may have made 
initial contact with one another on Facebook, April 6 Youth organizers also held 
meetings where members could put a face to his or her accompanying online profile. 
Special care had to be taken, however, for the group not to attract too much attention 
meeting offline, as the gathering of five or more individuals without a permit in Egypt 
can result in arrest or beatings by police (Wolman n.p.). April 6 Youth also took a cue 
from another precursor opposition movement, and established its organizational structure 
like that of Kefaya. As such, April 6 Youth was comprised of an elected general 
coordinator, four sub-coordinators, a steering committee and specialized committees and 
governorate committees (Shehata 115). Further offline activities came in the form of 
already outlined actions taken to publicize the April 6 through television advertisements, 
paper banners in public places, and written notes on currency. 
 With a now flourishing membership base, April 6 Youth took to broadening its 
online strategy by creating and maintaining dozens of Facebook pages (Saleh 480). 
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Recruitment pages held a separate presence from those dedicated to coordinating protest 
strategies, and the group also created tiered-pages that separately encompassed nation-, 
district-, and governorate-level organizing. Additionally, each of these pages had an 
English language counterpart to co-exist alongside each’s Arabic version (Saleh 480). In 
Wolman’s account of the inner workings of the April 6 Youth, he notes that Maher’s 
awareness of the Facebook group’s increasing new membership paved the way for the 
creation of more sub-groups (n.p.). This influx of new members also provided further 
opportunity for the group to “contact bloggers and other politically oriented online 
forums … asking them to support the workers by joining the April 6 group” (Wolman 
n.p.). According to Maher, just one year after its start, April 6 Youth had roughly 2,000 
active members across 12 governorates throughout Egypt (Shehata 115). 
 The morning of the April 6 strike in Mahalla, Maher and Abdel-Fattah shared 
last-minute details about organizing protests in Cairo via text and e-mail (Wolman n.p.). 
April 6 Youth employed a comprehensive use of digital tools to disseminate varying 
messages. According to Khamis and Vaughn, the group used “cell phones, blogs, Twitter, 
Facebook and YouTube to document police excesses, organize meetings and protests, 
alert each other to police movements, and get legal help for those who had been arrested” 
(147). This latter use came into relevance the very day of the strike, when Abdel-Fattah 
was arrested that afternoon (Wolman n.p.).  
Nearly two weeks later and with Abdel-Fattah still detained, her mother wrote an 
appeal to President Mubarak asking for the release of her daughter from prison. The 
emotional plea asking for Esra’s freedom was published in the Egyptian press, and, on 
April 23, officials released Esra (“Egypt Frees Facbook Activist” n.p.). After being freed, 
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Abdel-Fattah made a brief public statement that became a declaration of her departure 
from political activism (Wolman n.p.). According to news reports, Esra Abdel-Fattah was 
one of many activists and bloggers arrested throughout the country during this period 
(Knickmeyer A1). While the Egyptian government likely aimed to make an example of 
Abdel-Fattah’s arrest by signaling that “mobilizing virtual activism against the regime 
can bear individual costs” (Richter 21), it also had the opposing effect of catapulting 
public opinion in favor of Abdel-Fattah and the April 6 Youth (Wolman n.p.). Media 
coverage of her arrest and subsequent release garnered attention from foreign and few 
independent Egyptian newspapers, but the added press brought with it enough publicity 
to make her the heroine behind the April 6 Youth movement (Wolman n.p.). Despite 
security officials’ initially dismissive reaction to the April 6 organizing taking place 
online, the detention of Abdel-Fattah clearly signaled the Facebook page’s increasing 
threat level. Her arrest would deliberately reinforce the government’s message to activists 
that anti-government online activity would not go unnoticed (Wolman n.p.).  
April 6 Youth page administrator Maher met a similar fate to that of Abdel-
Fattah, after heading attempts to organize another strike on Mubarak’s May 4 birthday. 
Though this strike also failed to materialize, Maher was arrested May 7 for his online 
efforts (Wolman n.p.). Plucked from his vehicle on his drive home by a group of plain-
clothes security officials, Maher was then beaten and shoved into the mini-van the 
officers had arrived in. This began a 12-hour detention in which, according to Maher, he 
was stripped, beaten, dragged across floors, and threatened with electricity and rape. 
Ultimately, Maher’s captors had hoped to obtain his password to the April 6 Facebook 
page. The following morning, Maher gave his captors a fake password, which led to his 
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release (Wolman n.p.). To raise the public’s awareness of Maher’s arrest, prominent 
blogger Wael Abbas posted pictures of Maher’s bruised body on online (Herrera 346). 
Maher’s role as activist developed further as group organizer and digital 
administrator of the April 6 Youth Movement. His first experiences with activism, 
however, were his previously noted membership in Kefaya’s Youth for Change. The final 
Egyptian Internet incident outlined below reflects how Maher eventually merges his own 
previous experiences as an activist with another growing network of individuals.   
INDIVIDUAL VS. STATE OFFICIALS: ‘WE ARE ALL KHALED SAID,’ 2010 
 On June 6, 2010, 28-year-old Khaled Said was apprehended by two plain-clothes 
police officers inside an Internet café in Alexandria. The officers attacked Said, smashing 
his head against a marble counter inside the café, and then proceeded to continue the 
beating after dragging Said outside. Despite Said’s pleas for them to stop, they beat him 
in a building entrance where the officers repeatedly took Said’s head to the metal grate of 
a door. According to Said’s brother Ahmed, the two officers continued to beat Khaled 
until well after his death. Initially, Said’s lifeless body was left outside the building where 
he lived. But a police van with officers drove up, removed the body, drove off and 
returned the body to the same spot minutes later (El Deeb n.p.).  
 Though the attack was seemingly unprovoked, it was allegedly motivated by the 
police’s discovery that Said possessed video footage capturing Egyptian police sharing 
the “spoils from a drug bust among themselves.” Within days of Said’s death, images of 
his heavily battered body at the morgue began appearing on social networking sites (El 
Deeb n.p.). In death, Said was unrecognizable and shown in these images to have a 
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dislocated jaw, ripped lower lip, missing teeth, a skull so beaten it was sunken in, and a 
trail of dark blood streaming from his head (Ghonim 58). Said’s brother, also a U.S.-
based lawyer, immediately confirmed the authenticity of the photos, as they verified 
exactly what his family viewed at the morgue. Simultaneously, Egyptian police stated 
that the cause of Said’s death was under investigation (El Deeb n.p.). Between June 7 and 
June 12, a Facebook group entitled ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ (WAAKS) emerged online 
and called for “those accused of torture to be brought to justice.” Within roughly one 
week, the Facebook group had amassed about 142,000 members (Zayan n.p.). 
 Around June 9, the Egyptian police informed the Said Family that Khaled’s death 
was caused by a drug overdose prompted when Khaled choked from swallowing a bag of 
drugs just as he was being apprehended (El Deeb n.p.; Schemm n.p.). Three days later the 
Egyptian Interior Ministry issued a statement revealing the official autopsy results: Said’s 
cause of death was asphyxiation caused by choking on a bag of drugs (“Khaled Saeid’s 
Uncle” n.p.; Schemm n.p.). Also included in this statement was the accusation that Said 
had been a known drug user and that “all the small bruises and abrasions were 
insignificant in his death and that there were no fractures to his skull or any bones” 
(“Prosecutor General” n.p.; Schemm n.p.).  The official police statement, however, went 
even further in its allegations, indicating that Said not only used drugs, but also was 
“wanted for convictions in absentia for theft and weapons possession, in addition to 
evading compulsory military service” (Schemm n.p.). One day ahead of this 
announcement, Amnesty International, in conjunction with other rights groups, demanded 
the launch of an independent investigation into Said’s death (El Deeb n.p.).  
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 Unsettled by the Interior Ministry’s findings of the first autopsy, the Said Family 
appealed to the prosecutor general to request that Khaled’s body be exhumed for a second 
autopsy. Once approved, the second autopsy would be slated to occur around June 15 
(“Prosecutor General” n.p.). On this very date, the United States, via the State 
Department, issued a statement expressing concern over the cause of Said’s death and 
urged Egypt to “hold accountable whoever is responsible” (“U.S. Urges Accountability” 
n.p.). Said’s body was exhumed for its second autopsy on June 16, and the Interior 
Ministry did not reveal its accompanying results until one week later (“Khaled Saeid’s 
Body Exhumed” n.p.; “Second Autopsy Report” n.p.). 
In the interim, Said’s uncle held a press conference at the Cairo Journalists’ 
Syndicate where he rejected the Interior Ministry’s allegations against Khaled as 
deception (“Khaled Saeid’s Uncle” n.p.). The family emphasized this point by procuring 
a copy of Khaled’s certificate of completion, proving the fulfillment of his mandatory 
military service (Ghonim 66). Family lawyer Mohamed Abdel-Aziz echoed state 
officials’ lack of credibility when he told those gathered at the press conference that, 
“The interior ministry presented press statements which it imagined were defense 
evidence, but are in fact prosecution evidence. They are evidence of fabrication and lies” 
(“Khaled Saeid’s Uncle” n.p.). On June 23, the Alexandria appeals public prosecution 
office held its own press conference to announce results of the second autopsy. Its 
preliminary report upheld the findings of the first autopsy, and stated that injuries on 
Said’s body were the result of “contact with a solid object or objects” caused by “force 
used during the attempt to overpower the victim.” It also claimed that these injuries were 
“light” and did not contribute to Said’s death (“Second Autopsy Report” n.p.).  
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Once more human rights organizations responded, issuing statements pressing 
Egyptian authorities to re-consider taking more thorough actions related to the 
investigation of the Said case. On June 24, Human Rights Watch “cast doubt” on the 
autopsy and urged authorities to “question and charge the two plainclothes officers, along 
with the local prosecutor whose initial probe failed to interview eyewitnesses and gather 
proper evidence” (“HRW Urges Egypt” n.p.). Five days after announcement of the 
second autopsy’s results on June 28, the European Union Heads of Mission to Egypt 
“expressed concern” about the “circumstances” surrounding Said’s death. The EU 
statement went on to “welcome the declared readiness of the Egyptian authorities to 
conduct a judicial inquiry into this death and look forward to the inquiry being conducted 
impartially, transparently and swiftly in a way that will credibly resolve the 
discrepancies” (“EU Concerned” n.p.).   
By June 30, the two police officers, identified as 33-year-old Awad Ismail 
Suleiman and 26-year-old Mahmoud Sabry Mahmoud, were held in custody for four days 
in connection with the beating death of Said. According to news reports, the two were 
held “on suspicion of having committed offences” as outlined by three separate articles of 
the Egyptian Penal Code. Both men denied the charges. The Saids’ lawyer Abdel-Aziz, 
acting as their spokesman, indicated that the family was pleased the two were held in 
custody, but that the family would continue to press for the officers to be charged with 
“premeditated and intentional murder” (“Two Officers Remanded” n.p.). On July 4, it 
was announced that the two would remain in police custody until a trial date was set 
(“Policemen May Face” n.p.). Just four days later, the trial date was announced to begin 
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on July 27. By the date of this announcement, the WAAKS Facebook group had grown to 
about 200,000 members (“Egypt Court Sets” n.p.).  
While the trial of the two officers began on July 27 in an Alexandria criminal 
court, it is recognized as a legal proceeding marked by one adjournment after another. 
The first pushed the trial to September 25, and, by late October, the trial is again 
adjourned to November 27 (Saleh, “Egyptian Policemen Go” n.p.; “Khaled Saeid Trial” 
n.p.). Just two days after this first adjournment, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder during 
a visit to Cairo made a statement about the case. In speaking to reporters, Holder 
expressed concern about the trial’s transparency, and hoped “that if there is liability to be 
found then those who were responsible for anything that is deemed to be inappropriate 
will be held accountable” (“U.S. Urges Accountability n.p.). As the September court date 
approached, more third-party pressure arose when the U.N. Human Rights Council Chief 
named Egypt, among other countries, as a nation where civil rights activists had been 
targeted and harassed (“UN Council Chief” n.p.). On November 27, one day ahead of a 
scheduled Egyptian parliamentary election, the trial was adjourned once more to 
December 25 (“Egypt President’s” n.p.; “Khaled Saeid Brutality” n.p.). The trial’s 
announced adjournments continue, putting the case on the Alexandria court’s docket well 
into the next calendar year. 
On October 26, 2011, the two officers were eventually sentenced to seven years in 
prison and convicted of manslaughter (Afify n.p.). The punishment of the two as it is 
linked to police brutality is rare, as Egypt’s decades-long emergency law typically 
provides no accountability for victims at the hands of state police force (“Criminal 
Injustice” n.p.; Afify n.p.). The WAAKS Facebook group had grown immensely at this 
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point, increasing its membership from 220,000 in August 2010 to about 1.5 million 
members by the date of the officers’ sentencing in 2011 (Eltahawy A13; Afify n.p.). The 
case eventually went through a re-trial, and the two officers were sentenced again in 
March 2014, this time to 10 years in prison for the 2010 death of Said (“2 Officers 
Sentenced” n.p.).  
FORMATION OF THE MEDIA MESSAGE 
 News of Said’s death at the hands of the two police officers came to the public’s 
attention when social media sites Facebook and Twitter carried images of his disfigured 
body (Eltahawy n.p.). The dissemination of this imagery, in combination with the 
public’s already heightened sensitivities to police brutality, established early the public’s 
position surrounding this incident (Fahim and El-Naggar n.p.). As quickly as these photos 
appeared and without the provocation of any initial state response, Said was adopted by 
activists as a symbolic “martyr of the emergency law” (El Deeb n.p.). With the formation 
of the WAAKS Facebook group, this viewpoint only intensified as its objective became, 
in part, to render accountability to Said’s attackers (Zayan n.p.).  
 The interaction of state and public dialogue persists in this incident, as it will be 
seen that messages remain constant but gather intensity in response to opposing actions. 
This was set into motion with the June 12 Egyptian Interior Ministry statement 
announcing that Said’s cause of death was asphyxiation caused by swallowing a bag of 
marijuana, along with the accompanying declaration that Said regularly used drugs. 
Said’s depiction by the state as a criminal, was further bolstered by the police statement 
accusing him of prior convictions of theft, weapons possession and evasion of military 
service. The police statement went on to underscore that “the allegations reported by 
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some circles have intentionally ignored all the facts in order to show that the human 
rights situation in the country has been violated” (Schemm n.p.). Prior to the release of 
this Interior Ministry statement, Egyptian media had ignored and not reported on the 
beating death of Said. The then-anonymous administrator of the WAAKS Facebook 
group described Egyptian officials’ strategy, and what eventually become the media 
strategy, as simply “stain[ing] Khaled’s reputation” (Ghonim 64).  
On June 13, independent newspaper Nour’s Ghad  posted online an interview 
with the Internet café owner who gave an eyewitness account of Said’s attack in his 
business (Schemm n.p.). Additionally, Said’s mother interviewed with independent 
newspaper Al-Shorouk, sharing for the first time her suspicion that her son’s death was 
retribution for Khaled’s possessing the video of police (Ghonim 65). At this point, mere 
days after Said’s death, a Twitter hashtag in Said’s name appeared, and numerous 
Facebook users changed their profile photos to that of a picture of the young, living 
Khaled Said (Zayan n.p.). The state-run Al-Gomhouria daily newspaper retorted to the 
online activity by publishing a front page editorial condemning as “unpatriotic” those 
who had posted the pictures of a dead Said. The editorial went on to say that the photos 
of Said’s body were hardly proof of brutality, and then pointedly asked activists, “Do you 
hate Egypt that much?” Activists’ “instigations” only served to “tarnish Egypt and its 
human rights (record),” it read (Zayan n.p.).  
After the Said Family’s request for a second autopsy, this reaction from the state 
replayed itself. This time Al-Gomhouria reprinted in its pages the June 12 Interior 
Ministry statement accusing Said of regular drug use (“Prosecutor General Approves” 
n.p.). By June 15, the Said Family took to Facebook, posting to the WAAKS page a 
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statement that confirmed Khaled had completed his mandatory military service, and that 
underscored that the Interior Ministry had failed to acknowledge the eyewitness accounts 
of Khaled’s beating (“Police Crush Khaled” n.p.). Reinforcing this message ahead of the 
findings of the second autopsy, Khaled Said’s uncle held a press conference at the Cairo 
Journalists’ Syndicate on June 20 to refute once more the criminal accusations made 
against his nephew (“Khaled Saeid’s Uncle” n.p.).  
With the release of the second autopsy’s preliminary report and the accompanying 
press conference announcing that Said’s cause of death remained unchanged, the state 
media sustained its campaign of depicting Said as a criminal (“Second Autopsy” n.p.). 
State newspaper Al-Gomhouria repeatedly referred to Said as the “marijuana martyr” 
(“Said’s Family Denies” n.p.). This designation of Said by the state also emerged on the 
WAAKS Facebook page in the form of posted comments. After some investigation, the 
page’s administrator discovered it to be the handiwork of the NDP’s Electronic 
Committee (Ghonim 69).  
The results of the second autopsy served as a signal to members of the WAAKS 
group to organize more action against the Egyptian Interior Ministry and the results of the 
second botched autopsy. The Facebook page’s administrator openly stated so in 
comments on the page (“Second Autopsy Report” n.p.). This prompted the NDP to take 
notice of the Facebook traffic, and through state newspapers, diminish the social 
networking sites credibility by referring to it as “owned by the CIA” and as a tool used by 
the state’s enemies to “brainwash Egyptian youth” (Ghonim 74). On June 29, state media 
reported once more about Said’s criminal behavior, stating this time that he had been 
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discharged during his military service, and had charges filed against him for drug 
possession and “military indiscipline” (“Saeid’s Family Denies” n.p.).  
CONSTRUCTION OF NETWORKS & ORGANIZATIONS 
 As mentioned, outrage over the second autopsy’s unwavering findings compelled 
members of the WAAKS Facebook group to take action, spurring what news accounts 
regarded as the largest protest in connection with Said’s death (“Thousands of Egyptians” 
n.p.). On June 25, 2010, about 3,000 protestors in Alexandria gathered to demonstrate not 
only against the latest autopsy results, but also against police brutality (“Second Autopsy 
Report” n.p.; “Thousands of Egyptians” n.p.). This time, opposition leader Mohamed 
ElBaradei joined the protestors who had gathered outside of the Sidi Gaber Mosque 
despite the presence of riot police (“Hundreds Protest” n.p.; “Thousands of Egyptians” 
n.p.). Following the protest, ElBaradei said to reporters that the gathering was “a clear-
cut message to the regime that the Egyptian people are sick and tired of practices that are 
inhumane. If they don’t get the message, then there is a problem with the regime; the 
writing is on the wall” (“Thousands of Egyptians” n.p.). Protestors who took part in the 
demonstration chanted slogans against Mubarak and the Egyptian Interior Minister. 
Police reaction at this protest differed greatly from that witnessed in the past, as it 
remained largely peaceful and without use of force (“Thousands of Egyptians” n.p.).  
 The WAAKS Facebook group planned another protest for July 9, shortly after the 
late July trial date was set for the two police officers charged in connection with Said’s 
death. With its group now numbering about 200,000 members, administrators of the 
Facebook page asked that members take part in silent protests across the country (“Egypt 
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Court Sets” n.p.). Specifically seeking a non-violent means to bring awareness to the 
cause, the page’s administrator referred to the event as a “Silent Stand of Prayer,” and 
created a Facebook event in this name to bring members out to the Alexandria Corniche, 
a stretch of road alongside the water (Ghonim 70-71). At this point in time, the WAAKS 
group’s membership was augmented by members of other opposition groups, including 
those backed by ElBaradei (“Online Protest” n.p.). As part of this “silent stand,” the 
WAAKS Facebook group members were asked to wear all black and stand quietly apart 
from one another at a specified location in cities throughout Egypt. The page 
administrator urged protestors not to gather in groups, as standing apart would not attract 
as much police attention. Standing quietly apart, after all, would not infringe on the 
emergency law’s restriction of small gatherings (“Online Protest” n.p.). Protestors were 
also encouraged to bring Bibles or Qur’ans to “read in peace” (Ghonim 70). While the 
Facebook page worked to build member participation and “confidence,” the page 
administrator also set out to attract media attention by crafting a press release designed to 
not only generate publicity but also reach out to “common Egyptians” not on Facebook 
(Ghonim 73). Published on the Facebook page itself and distributed on the streets by 
members in the form of invitations, the release generated a significant response (Ghonim 
74).  
Reuters reported that on the date of the Silent Stand, groups stood in silence along 
streets in Cairo; hundreds stood along the waterfront in Alexandria; and others gathered 
in the towns of Damietta and Tanta (“Online Protest” n.p.). According to another Reuters 
article, 8,000 people across the country had participated in this event initiated by the 
Facebook group (Ghonim 79). On the evening of July 9, WAAKS administrators posted 
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to the page every image received, and participants themselves posted their own pictures 
to the group’s page (Ghonim 78, 79). One page member and protestor taking part in the 
Alexandria demonstration, took video footage from her car of those standing quietly apart 
along the cornice. The video shows participant after participant dressed in black, standing 
apart and lined up along the corniche (Ghonim 78).  
 The initial anonymous administrator of this Facebook page, who later revealed 
himself to be Google executive Wael Ghonim, employed a number of deliberate 
strategies when he initially created this group online in June 2010. In posting comments 
and articles to the page, he chose to address members by writing in first person to portray 
the “voice” of a deceased Khaled Said (Ghonim 61). By doing so, Ghonim said that it 
“had a greater impact on the page’s members. It was as though Khaled Said was speaking 
from his grave” (61). Long before organizing Facebook events, Ghonim launched 
awareness campaigns that asked page members to change their profile photos to an image 
of Khaled Said (67). Ghonim stated that his ultimate goal for the page was to “mobilize” 
support, and he specifically detailed how he aimed to do so, saying that
The first phase was to convince people to join the page and read its posts. The second 
was to convince them to start interacting with the content by “liking” and commenting on 
it. The third was to get them to participate in the page’s online campaigns and to 
contribute to its content themselves. The fourth and final phase would occur when people 
decided to take the activism onto the street. This was my ultimate aspiration (67-68). 
 Moving beyond the first few months after Said’s death, the Facebook group 
continued to gain membership and maintain prominence. In November 2010, the 
Facebook group had roughly 330,000 members. This same month, and shortly before the 
Egyptian parliamentary election on November 28, the WAAKS Facebook group 
disappeared entirely off the Web for 15 hours (“Egypt Facebook Pages” n.p.). Although 
 
85 
 
not confirmed, page administrators surmised that Egyptian officials likely swamped the 
group’s page with complaint messages, which Facebook’s security protocols 
automatically interpret as spam and shut down the page. The Facebook page was now 
also equipped with an additional administrator based out of the United States, and she 
took immediate action to contact Facebook executives to re-instate the page (Saleh and 
Wahab 242). Stefano Hesse, Facebook head of communications for Europe, Middle East 
and Africa, said in a Reuters interview, “We have been working with political and human 
rights groups both inside and outside of Egypt since this was brought to our attention to 
explain the measures they need to take to keep their accounts and associated activity 
within the site rules” (“Egypt Facebook Pages” n.p.). 
 By 2011, the WAAKS page administrator collaborated in planning a January 25 
Police Day event with many other opposition groups, to include activist Ahmed Maher 
(Ghonim 144). Two years prior, Maher and a friend had created a similar Facebook group 
in support of a textile workers’ strike. As already demonstrated, Maher’s experiences 
with Kefaya and the April 6 Youth Movement paved the way for this collaboration with 
WAAKS. This partnership would eventually go on to play a significant role in the 2011 
uprisings. 
Table 3.1 offers a summation of each Egyptian incident’s three corresponding 
descriptive sections. Each incident is thus outlined here first by its characteristic agent 
interaction, which also develops to form the focus of eventual network formation. This is 
then followed by the state’s media message, citizen/netizen message and, finally, the 
scenario’s outcome. This framework sets the stage for the comparative analysis of all 
incidents present in Chapter 4.
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Incident 
Agent 
Interaction/ 
Focus of 
Network 
Formation 
Media 
Message 
Citizen/Netizen 
Message 
Outcome 
May 25 
Referendum 
Vote, 2005 
Groups 
vs. 
State Officials 
Participation 
as Patriotism 
End of Mubarak’s 
Rule 
Re-election 
of Mubarak 
for Another 
Term 
Textile 
Workers’ 
Strike, 2008 
Multiple 
Citizens 
vs. 
State Officials 
Dismissal 
of Issues 
Inflation/ 
Regime Overthrow 
Increased 
Salaries 
Nullified by 
Increased 
Prices, Taxes 
Khaled Said, 
2010 
Single 
Individual 
vs. 
State Officials 
Victim’s 
Tarnished 
Image 
Police Brutality/ 
Regime Overthrow 
Protracted Court 
Proceedings, 10-
Year Sentences 
for Police 
Officers in 2014   
Table 3.1 Framework for Egyptian Incidents 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
 
The Integrative Conceptual Model of Internet Analysis (ICMIA) presented in 
Chapter 1 made way for subsequent discussion in Chapter 2 of how these sub-fields of 
study overlapped. This area of intersection proceeded to reveal focus on the sustained 
presence of public-media interactions among these three sub-fields, and as they were 
applied to incidents in both Chapters 2 and 3. This research returns once more to the 
broad framework of the analysis model presented in Chapter 1.  
The ICMIA served well to isolate the particular actors involved in Internet 
incidents, while also honing in on the dialogue generally presented by each. Focusing on 
public-media interactions also provided a solidified approach to deciphering the 
Internet’s niche in scenarios that linked varying components of the public sphere. 
Through assessment of public-media interactions it could more readily be acknowledged 
how the Internet served to mediate the reactions of state officials, the reactions of 
citizens, and each party’s subsequent actions. When taken comprehensively this dialogue 
can present the chaos of many voices, but this model took care to assign some order to 
this potential for noise. 
While the ICMIA pinpointed which actors to focus on, its application revealed a 
departure from the anticipated type of relationships it might highlight. For example, 
expected findings in Chapter 1 stated that this research would uncover relationships 
between media and citizens that might pose a threat to the state.
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 Instead research uncovered that the most important and threatening relationships 
are those forged among citizens and that may translate to an ability to organize and 
mobilize. Another expected finding anticipated different types of interactivity that would 
take place between the media and citizens as mediated by the Internet. Analysis of the 
incidents in both countries yields the realization that interactivity is not necessarily a 
constant. In some incidents, interactivity did occur while in others there was little to be 
had, given that government discourse via the Internet was largely minimized. 
The framework did, however, shed light on seeking answers to some of the 
related research questions presented in Chapter 1. Broadly, the notion of Web 
technologies influencing media reporting in authoritarian regimes was evidenced as 
having a variable effect, as China indicated the possibility of some influence while none 
seemed to exist in Egypt. Additionally, no relationship was found to exist between 
citizens and state media; instead, the significance of relationship building came via 
citizens’ ability to form relationships with one another. This ultimately proved far more 
powerful in serving to threaten the state. Finally, this model did serve to highlight the 
differing ways ICTs were used to ultimately reach the same unifying objective of 
organizing either people or vitally important information that would publicly disclose 
corruption. 
This model derives strength from its ability to succinctly capture the key 
messages that represent both the state’s and the public’s stance toward one another. 
Especially helpful is the fact that these key messages translate seamlessly to become the 
framing narratives of activists. This once again highlights the media’s role in providing 
legitimacy to both the state and its citizens. While this model does provide insight into 
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online advocacy’s effects on media, more broadly, it does not offer a way to gauge to 
what degree this Internet activity influenced the incident’s real-world, offline outcome. 
Another potential drawback is the model’s reliance on third party accounts in not only re-
telling the incidents, but also correctly translating them to include the appropriate cultural 
nuances.   
This model of Internet analysis stands to be more readily applicable to the years 
following 2010, as ICTs have evolved to allow more instantaneous and easily tracked 
online dialogue. While nothing specific precludes application of the model to a period 
prior to 2005, it is possible that the type of interaction analyzed here would be more 
fragmented due to being less well-documented. Research focusing on the May 25, 2005, 
referendum vote in Egypt offered this as a clue, since ICTs’ capacity to spur real-time 
activity was only beginning then to be realized. This model would be especially insightful 
to apply to Egyptian and Chinese incidents after 2011. Differing perspectives may derive 
from post-2011 incidents in Egypt, as political transition might potentially reflect a 
marked difference in interactions between the media and the public. In China, the 
differences might be noted via the government’s increasingly more stringent measures to 
control both Internet users and content. As might be expected, the model does, of course, 
bring with it the limitation of some parameters set by the existence of the Internet and 
ICTs themselves. Applying this model to other authoritarian regimes, at a most basic 
level, would rely on the presence of a population that employs use of these Web-based 
technologies.  
With the Internet-mediated incidents of China and Egypt outlined in previous 
chapters, this research now turns to analysis of all six scenarios. The forthcoming areas of 
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analysis were noted as research was conducted, and they explore categories that 
encompass both the media and the public. This connects the analysis directly back to the 
media-public interaction highlighted in Chapter 2 as the unifying aspect of the ICMIA’s 
differing fields of study. 
SINGLE- VS. MULTI-ISSUE CITIZEN DISSENT 
 The Internet incidents presented in this research reflect a contrast in the number of 
issues Chinese and Egyptian citizens adapt into their representative online advocacy. 
Assessment of the Chinese incidents under review reveals that, despite a variance in 
cause, citizens’ reaction stems singularly from government corruption. In the case of 
Deng Yujiao, for example, local government actors’ behavior illustrates the state’s 
degeneracy; while, in the incidents of the Sichuan earthquake and tainted milk formula, 
corruption is well-rooted in the procedural dealings of business entities inextricably 
linked to the government. As such, representative public opinion generated online 
focused solely on the governmental vice specific to each incident, and, though it may 
have pushed the boundaries of acceptable questioning of CCP authority, it stopped short 
of calling for complete reform of the central government. This finding aligns with some 
scholars’ examination of the issues underlying Chinese Internet activism.  
According to Lee, in China, “popular contention faces issue-specific 
opportunities,” while “issues that directly challenge the legitimacy of the party-state are 
hardly ever tolerated” (9). The CCP’s long-established precision of monitoring online 
discussions has served to create a pointed awareness in citizens of the state’s clearly 
delineated “hierarchy” of permissibility (Lee 9). Subsequently, most citizens inherently 
know which topics are apt to elicit swift and direct government reaction, often in the form 
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of online censorship (Lee 9). Lin’s assessment of Chinese online activism mirrors this, 
and points to the conclusion that citizens’ voices gain more traction through a focus on a 
“specific problem” versus “general issues” (534). By doing so, citizens increase the 
probability of evading government suppression, while also maximizing the reach of their 
opinions by virtue of their remaining intact somewhere online (Lin 534). 
In both the incidents of the Sichuan earthquake and the poisoned Sanlu milk 
formula, public opinion remains focused on government corruption, but also treads 
dangerously close to what the CCP deemed as “acceptable questioning.” The fact that 
both scenarios affected a broader geographic region and thousands of citizens may very 
well account for this boundary pushing. While citizens did focus their initial outrage on 
local officials, the inaction at the provincial level inevitably prompted citizens to target 
the central government for their grievances. The Deng Yujiao incident also reflects this 
single-issue focus. Although citizens’ reaction in this scenario did well to expand media 
attention beyond the province, citizens’ not casting their disdain upon the central 
government may be attributed to the incident’s largely localized nature. 
 Egypt, on the other hand, presents Internet scenarios in which activism openly 
targeted the regime, but also incorporated socio-economic and human rights issues with 
it. While this notion of openly challenging the NDP stands in sharp contrast to Chinese 
online activism, it also functions to create a unifying thread that links together each 
Egyptian incident in this research. Each highlights the fact that, despite citizens’ focus on 
grievances of police brutality or inflation, public opinion always bridged back to the 
Mubarak regime as the source. While different Egyptian groups initiated the Internet 
activities behind each incident, the pervasive “master frame” of ending Mubarak’s rule 
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endured, providing the cohesion needed to mobilize throughout the time frame presented 
in this research (Singerman 19). Kefaya’s opposition began as a challenge to Mubarak’s 
legitimacy and, after May 25, 2005, parlayed into highlighting repression at the hands of 
the NDP. Both the Mahalla textile workers’ strike in 2008 and the beating death of 
Khaled Said in 2010 exemplified this too, as both the April 6 Youth and WAAKS 
identified the Mubarak regime as the originator and supporter of economic and social 
injustice. Firm establishment of this foundation for grievances, Singerman notes, would 
prove especially critical in what would go on to become the 2011 uprisings (19).  
In describing what they refer to as Egypt’s “Four Waves of Protest,” Gunning and 
Zvi Baron confirm that each phase of grievances focused on specific, but multi-pronged, 
issues (33). The time frame of the second wave, designated as taking place from 2004 to 
2006 and coinciding with the start of Egyptian incidents in this research, “constituted the 
first, direct, organized popular challenge against the Mubarak regime,” encompassed the 
2005 elections and constitutional amendments, and arched to economic and human rights 
grievances. The third wave, from 2006 to 2009, was characterized primarily by labor 
issues, but also maintained discourse that opposed the regime (Gunning and Zvi Baron 
34). This accurately characterizes the issues encompassed by the April 6 Youth. Finally, 
the fourth wave, from 2010 to 2011, not only focused on another election year, but also 
“police brutality, economic hardship, and regime attempts to create sectarian tensions” 
(Gunning and Zvi Baron 34). By the 2011 Arab Spring, according to Gunning and Zvi 
Baron, this fourth wave had captured the well-established “networks and grievances from 
the previous three waves” (34). Each Egyptian Internet incident, therefore, coincides with 
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each protest phase and reflects that citizens’ opposition online was just as multi-faceted 
as the activities intended for activists taking to the streets. 
These phases of protest connect directly back to Egyptian Internet activism in that 
they not only highlight the multiple grievances existent in each incident, but also reflect 
how organizing online translated into street activism offline. The narratives of this multi-
issue dissent had their origins in every day experiences, combined with the repressive 
rule of the NDP, developed behind the scenes via ICTs like blogs and Facebook pages, 
and became citizens’ rallying cries in a number of protests. In short, these protest waves 
serve to echo the guidebook of grievances adopted by Egyptian activist groups in 
conjunction with the news event of each scenario. 
EVIDENCE OF CITIZENS’ DELIBERATE INTERNET STRATEGY  
 Prior to discussion of citizens’ use of the Internet, it is important to examine first 
the type of agents whose interactions are critical to understanding both the incident itself 
and the eventual focus of network formation. Government officials are the one constant 
agent in all six incidents. However, citizens’ representation manifests itself in varying 
agent forms. In the case of China, citizen representation is embodied in either a single 
individual or a conglomeration of multiple, independent individuals joined together by a 
common cause. It is important to note here that the loose affiliation of many single 
individuals in this country does not necessarily function as a unified group. While this is 
also true in Egypt, this country’s agent interaction also includes citizen representation 
through established groups. This variety in the type of citizen agents in both countries 
does well to represent the gamut of potential agent interaction combinations. China’s 
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notable lack of citizen representation through a group, and Egypt’s inclusion of one, may 
well hint at the ability of the citizens within each country to form strong networks. This 
will be explored at greater length in a forthcoming section of this chapter.  
The Chinese and Egyptian Internet incidents assessed disclose the fact that, in 
most all cases examined here, citizens who used ICTs to construct some form of a 
network, did so in a guided, strategic manner. Of the six outlined incidents, only that of 
China’s Deng Yujiao lacks sufficient evidence to support this finding. This may be 
attributed to the news event’s short time span before reaching resolution, or the fact that it 
remained contained at the local level within provincial boundaries. The remaining five 
incidents, both in China and Egypt, illustrate how specific activists or groups of activists 
used the Internet, albeit in different ways, to act upon available opportunities. 
 In both the Sanlu scandal and the collapsed schools of the Sichuan quake, 
documentation exists to support the fact that individual activists took the lead in culling a 
membership base in response to each incident’s respective grievance. For example, Ai 
Weiwei’s Citizen Investigation team united through Ai’s blog, but, when it was censored 
by the CCP, the team released video footage, interview transcripts and its growing list of 
deceased children via Twitter and the blogs of other members. Similarly, Zhao Lianhai’s 
website, created due to his own child’s illness, resulted in not only a repository of 
medical information about affected children, but also connected families through the 
construction of a loose virtual network. Once united through this alliance, some family 
members then came together offline to represent their stance against governmental 
inertia.  
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 While Chinese incidents reflect online activity driven by individual activists, the 
Internet strategies behind Egyptian incidents represent the activities of an organized 
group. Kefaya, the April 6 Youth and WAAKS also all engaged in planning that 
ultimately aimed to translate into mobilizing street activism. Kefaya’s ongoing 
relationship with an established community of bloggers, its use of e-mail distribution lists 
to organize and its calculated placement of imagery, serve as examples of this. For the 
April 6 Youth, the group’s online strategizing is evident in, among other ways, the 
creation of additional Facebook pages and sub-groups that held expressly different aims 
for membership and protest organizing. Finally, the marketing skills of the WAAKS page 
administrator were masterfully employed in the four-part approach that began with 
amassing membership and led to the ultimate goal of organizing on Egyptian streets. 
 Despite this commonality of deliberate planning strategies between Chinese and 
Egyptian incidents, the Internet activities of Egyptian groups reflect a far more well-
developed capacity for network formation. This may result from the way each country’s 
government responds to citizens’ use of the Internet. The CCP acts quickly to eliminate 
online content that challenges the government, while the NDP’s Electronic Committee 
maintains a relatively loose hold on Web content. Research shows that the NDP prefers 
to punish the individuals generating the content versus removal of the content itself (Faris 
n.p.). Seldom did retaliatory online activity by the NDP emerge as these Egyptian 
incidents unfolded. Given that the Mubarak regime largely dismissed these online 
activities as inconsequential, this lack of governmental response makes sense.  
Nevertheless, it appears that Egyptian activist groups have capitalized from this 
sustained online presence, which allows activists the opportunity for more refined 
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planning. This same opportunity may not be afforded in China given the government’s 
sophisticated mechanisms of control on Web content, in addition to well-established CCP 
organizations devoted wholly to policing real-time Web activity. Thus, the prompt 
removal of anti-government content thwarts any further potential for activists to 
strengthen online networks, thereby greatly diminishing the chance to engage in detailed 
planning for offline organizing. 
CITIZEN REACTION AS INFLUENCING MEDIA AGENDA-SETTING 
 As seen in Chapters 2 and 3, once an incident takes place, citizens turned to 
different Internet platforms to voice their opinions online. Whether on websites, blogs, 
bulletin boards, or social networking sites, citizens’ posting of opinions slowly carved its 
own niche in the conversation. Can this in any way influence the state-run media’s 
reaction, and subsequently, its reporting? In China, research related to these incidents 
suggests that it is possible. Tang and Sampson, for example, cite the online public’s 
opinion surrounding the sexual assault of Deng Yujiao as “sustaining the news agenda” 
(464). After citizens became familiar with the incident’s basic facts, they reacted 
vehemently against Deng’s attackers, which, in turn, prompted media to report on those 
reactions and view the case with heightened suspicion (Tang and Sampson 464). This 
type of interaction of “mutual feedback and momentum,” maintained a steady focus on 
the case and yielded opinion headlines in newspapers like “Deng Yujiao case opens the 
era when everybody is a judge” (Tang and Sampson 465). Similarly, Siu’s content 
analysis of newspapers and an Internet portal and bulletin board during the Sanlu scandal 
suggests that a correlation exists between online reaction and its influences on the 
media’s reporting. This is especially true in the incident’s latter phases, as citizens had 
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time to develop their opinions online and state media took subsequent steps to respond 
(Siu 379). In her research, Siu concludes that, “The [Internet] portal and the bulletin 
board should be regarded as another source that predicts topic salience and the coverage 
tone of traditional news media in terms of inter media agenda setting” (379).  
 This conception of online reaction as influencing media agenda-setting differs 
significantly with regard to Egyptian incidents. This can be attributed, first and foremost, 
to established periods of media repression like that evidenced during the 2008 El-Mahalla 
strikes. Since it can be seen here that state media implemented well-calculated measures 
to preclude reporters from covering the strikes, it seems a logical extension for media to 
refuse granting legitimacy to any activist groups supporting anti-government activities. 
This lack of netizens’ influence on reporting certainly also stems from the Egyptian 
government’s acknowledgment that media coverage of dissenting online public opinion 
would only serve to threaten the regime itself (Richter 19). As Richter notes, “The wider 
the reflection of the struggle between the different sides spreads, the less can the 
authoritarian regime deny the existence of other interests and perspectives and their needs 
to respond to them” (19). This coincides with the thoughts of a former national Egyptian 
TV anchor who said that “the national media performance was part of a plan to 
marginalize Egyptian people and [deceive] them into believing that the governing regime 
is the best they can get” (Sayed 278). Insight like this demonstrates clearly how no room 
exists in Egypt for the same type of state media agenda setting evident in China. 
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STATE MEDIA-MARKET TYPE 
 Discussion of media agenda-setting parlays here into a look at the operating 
environment of state media outlets and how their corresponding ownership may affect 
news content. Rugh’s characterization of the Egyptian press during this time frame puts it 
squarely in the category of “mobilized press,” which he describes as “the almost total 
subordination of the media system to the political system … controlled by revolutionary 
governments” (Hafez 454). Despite the emergence of independent media outlets under 
the rule of Mubarak, the privatization of some newspapers, for example, still pits these 
owners against the well-established reporting restrictions put in place by the state (Kandil 
40; Freedom House, “Egypt” 92). It also creates for independent media a reliance on the 
state for resources, like printing and distribution sources. Thus, the majority of Egyptian 
newspapers and periodicals are wholly government owned, permitting the state a singular 
role in not only censorship, but also regulation and patronage (Freedom House, “Egypt” 
92). By extension, the state’s funding of media secures advertising dollars, imparted 
almost solely from government-owned entities or ad agencies (Keenan 190). With 
obvious revenue at stake, Egyptian media would therefore be less inclined to upset the 
status quo of government support. This consequently explains why the Egyptian media 
would not embrace reporting about activist groups or their online activities. 
 This differs from China, whose news outlets are similarly government owned but 
lean more toward commercialization (Freedom House, “China” 78). Economic reforms 
introduced during the 1980s allowed the media as an industry to shift focus to business 
interests, a change from its sole function as state “mouthpiece” (Tang and Sampson 459). 
Subsequently, this signaled a shift in the media’s revenue sources, with advertising 
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dollars from businesses now funding the majority of operations (Tang and Sampson 459; 
Freedom House, “China” 78).  
These changes brought with them the capacity to influence the type of content 
appearing in Chinese print media. With advertising dollars now the primary source of 
income, this re-aligned content by moving it away from the party and instead toward the 
consumer (Freedom House, “China” 78). But, as Freedom House points out, it also 
created “economic incentives to reinforce political pressure and self-censorship, as 
publications fear the financial costs of being shut down … as well as the loss of 
advertising revenue should they run afoul of powerful societal actors” (78). Apart from 
fiscal incentives, the emphasis on the consumer also caused media to assess its audience 
demographics. Hence, Chinese media realized for the first time that reporting on topics 
generating “audience appeal” might prove profitable (Tang and Sampson 459). While the 
state certainly continues to keep tight reins on its media, it has loosened its grip slightly 
with this realization. It is therefore under this pretext that reporting about Internet-
mediated incidents has made its way into Chinese media, as these topics are now known 
to generate the buzz of added consumer interest.  
Although close attention to Chinese incidents’ development may seemingly prove 
otherwise, this time period in China has also been regarded as one of relative 
transparency and openness. This is especially true after the Sichuan earthquake, as 
viewed against the backdrop of government reaction to previous year’s natural disasters 
or accidents. This loosening of media controls may potentially allow for reporting on 
public opinion as a way to detract from some criticism of the CCP. However, it also 
permits the state to claim greater freedoms in a venue that precludes the formation of 
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networks and potential mobilization. Certainly, this is not as true when content combines 
with the interactivity of citizens’ reactions online since this undoubtedly leads to online 
public opinion as a foundation for network formation. As already evidenced, this poses 
too great a risk for the CCP, and thus makes way for the Chinese Internet’s sophisticated 
system of control and regulation. 
LEVEL OF GLOBAL ATTENTION ON STATE: CHINA’S 2008 BEIJING 
OLYMPICS 
 In 2001, long before the International Olympic Committee’s decision to select 
Beijing for the 2008 Summer Olympics, China vowed it would allow free press and 
Internet access if it were to host the summer games (“IOC Reneges on Promise” n.p.). 
The country’s maintained pledge of these freedoms, in fact, had played a singular role in 
the IOC’s consideration of China as a contender to host. So committed was China to free 
access that in January 2007, the CCP issued media guidelines enabling free reporting on 
the Olympics and China itself (Guthrie n.p.). Through mid-July 2008 this promise was 
maintained by both China and the IOC, until July 30. That is the date the IOC announced 
that its joint “promise of Internet freedom” with China had been broken as CCP leaders 
permitted the censoring of select websites (“IOC Reneges on Promise” n.p.). Reporters at 
the Olympic Press Center had already encountered blocks on websites to include those of 
Amnesty International, Radio Free Asia, any sites related to Tibet and Taiwan and, for a 
time, the BBC website (Guthrie n.p.). 
Although foreign press maintained a steady presence in China, the Beijing games 
would usher in an additional 20,000 journalists (Guthrie n.p.). As they began descending 
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on the capital city, it quickly became apparent that reporters would have to scale 
bureaucratic obstacles to perform their job duties. The state required broadcast journalists 
to hold permits, and, eventually negotiations arose when conflict erupted over access to 
Tiananmen Square. Two days of “closed-door meetings” yielded permission with 
enumerated restrictions on timing of live broadcasts, accompanying parties, and further 
instructions on obtaining additional permits (Guthrie n.p.). These “freer” restrictions 
required state re-adjustment once more when the quake struck and stories of poorly 
constructed schools emerged. This time the orders called for restrictions on the “range of 
topics” journalists would be allowed to cover (Guthrie n.p.).  
The Beijing Olympic Games were to China like a lens set at its widest aperture, 
allowing the world an invitation to see this Eastern nation’s operations within its 
broadest, most revealing view. However, as Chinese officials soon discovered, this 
sweeping perspective brought with it the benefits of showcasing the country’s assets, but 
also the danger of displaying political fissures at their fullest. This is precisely what 
created such great discomfort for the CCP, especially in a year replete with both 
manmade and natural disasters. Jon Williams, BBC chief of news operations, described 
China’s nuanced stance on reporting by saying, “The image that gets around is that China 
is not open to foreign journalists. And it’s not true … My experience is the Chinese are 
more open to us telling the world about China. They are less open to us telling China 
about the world. And they are actively suspicious about us telling China about China” 
(Guthrie n.p.).  
Williams’ assessment explains perfectly the state’s incremental notes of 
progression and regression as they pertain to the media. Countless times, but especially 
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with regard to the Sanlu scandal and the Sichuan quake, the state attempted to positively 
promote itself, only to be forced to reorient its message when the spotlight shined too 
brightly on the same scenario’s political insensitivities. In 2008, this is compounded by 
the fact that scores of foreign journalists in-country for the games stood ready to report 
on these very topics. In short, when the PRC detected it might be losing grip on the 
message intended for the media’s agenda, leaders would mitigate the tension by issuing 
directives that tried to reset the agenda on a more palatable course. Thus, China’s hosting 
of the 2008 Olympics is a critical piece of context in understanding the state’s actions 
with regard to its media during these incidents. 
GLOBAL ATTENTION ON STATE: EGYPT AS TARGET OF U.S. 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
 During President George W. Bush’s inaugural address in January 2005, he 
emphasized the paramount importance of imparting democratic processes to the 
institutions of nations marked by “tyranny.” As such, Bush went on to state that, “to help 
young democracies succeed, we must help them build free institutions to fill the vacuum 
created by change” (Craner n.p.). The post-9/11 Bush administration had already ushered 
in an era focused on foreign policy aimed at political reform in Arab nations. The 
rationale then that cultivating democratization would weaken the seeds sown by terrorism 
and political instability, resurfaced once more in this president’s second term (Oweidat et 
al. vii).  
 Egypt’s standing as one of the largest countries in the Middle East, along with a 
history of mutually beneficial relations with the United States, made it a prime candidate 
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for these democratization efforts (Snider and Faris n.p.; Oweidat et al. vii). With the 
approach of the 2005 elections, Egypt found itself at the fore of “heavy domestic and 
international pressure to devise a more credible [electoral] system” (Hamzawy and 
Brown 2). This intensified with the cancellation of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s 
visit to Cairo as a result of the arrest of opposition candidate Ayman Nour in early 2005. 
In a June 20, 2005, speech at the American University in Cairo, Rice stated, “The 
Egyptian government must fulfill the promise it has made to its people — and to the 
entire world — by giving its citizens the freedom to choose” (Craner n.p.).   
EXTERNAL THIRD- OR MULTI-PARTY PRESSURE ON STATE 
 Of the six incidents assessed, only two Egyptian incidents include significant 
involvement by an external party or multiple parties urging the state to respond in a 
specified way. This is most evident in the 2010 death of Khaled Said in which not only 
the United States issued statements, but also human rights groups and intergovernmental 
organizations followed suit. These statements acted to re-enforce demands on the 
Mubarak regime to bring justice to Said’s attackers. In total, the list of outside entities 
commenting on Said’s killing, autopsy, related court proceedings, or human rights 
abuses, generally, included more than six separate organizations. While it’s not entirely 
possible to gauge this pressure’s effects on online reaction, at a minimum it continued to 
keep the citizens’ message of police brutality at a fore. 
The 2005 referendum vote also included in its timeline moments when an external 
entity exerted pressure on the NDP to act in a specific way, this time in the context of the 
electoral process. This third-party was the United States calling upon Egypt to conduct a 
fair and transparent vote, as evident in statements made by both the president of the 
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United States and U.S. officials. Ironically, the NDP did embrace aspects of this pressure; 
however, it quickly accommodated it in such a way that allowed it to be couched as 
progress toward an ultimately self-serving end. This is evident in the NDP’s permitting 
opposition candidates on the ballot, only to have them meet up against insurmountable 
and unrealistic challenges to participate in the vote. The origins of this pressure on 
Egypt’s NDP with regard to the May 25 referendum is best understood through the above 
outlined cause of international attention on the country. Another party, Human Rights 
Watch, also entered in criticizing Egypt, this time for NDP brutality against protestors on 
the day of the vote.  
While external multi-party pressure is evident in at least these two Egyptian 
incidents, it is notably absent in all Chinese incidents assessed in this research. This kind 
of interference in Egypt may result primarily from the alliance forged between it and the 
United States. Given that during this time period the U.S. contributed nearly $1 billion in 
aid to Egypt annually, this likely justified U.S. efforts to offer commentary on abuses of 
democratization and human rights in moments when American officials felt it most 
opportune (Oweidat et al. 4). This would not only create the perception of the U.S. 
furthering democratization efforts in the Middle East, but also create the appearance of 
continuously tethered relations between the two nations. Though closer scrutiny might 
reveal that these relations are not necessarily in sync with one another, in some ways the 
mere dialogue still managed to project the perception of a valued relationship. 
Meanwhile, the United States stood to benefit by securing an alliance with an oil-rich 
state that also allowed it access to geography of critical importance during previous 
military operations (Oweidat et al. 4).  
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The comparative analysis of these Chinese and Egyptian incidents reflects the 
possibilities and limitations ICTs can bring to citizens’ discourse with the state. As made 
apparent here, the resultant outcome of an Internet incident is dependent not only on 
political factors as much as those influenced by social, cultural and technological 
capacities. Table 4.1 below offers a summation of the comparative analysis of Egyptian 
and Chinese Internet incidents, as framed by the six focus areas detailed above.  
Table 4.1   Comparative Analysis of Internet Incidents, 2005-2010 
  
China Egypt 
P
U
B
L
IC
 
Number of Issues 
as Presented by Citizens’ Dissent 
Single Multiple 
Evidence of Deliberate Internet 
Strategy As Used by Citizens 
Yes Yes 
Citizens’ Online Reaction 
as State Media Agenda-Setting 
Yes No 
S
T
A
T
E
 /
 M
E
D
IA
 
State Media-Market Type Commercialized Few Privatized 
Global Attention on State during 
Time Frame 
Yes, 2008 Yes, 2005 
External Third- or Multi-Party 
Pressure on State 
No Yes 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Although this research initially set out to focus on relationships between citizens 
and media within their respective countries, assessment of the six incidents revealed that, 
as a whole, the most significant associations are those forged among a nation’s citizens. 
The capacity to establish and build upon these connections ultimately translates into the 
foundation for the networks critical to social movement. Considered in conjunction with 
this was the Internet’s ability to not only facilitate these connections with greater speed, 
but also allow for sustained two-way communication.    
Especially striking is the pointed difference in network formation stemming from 
Internet-mediated incidents that took place in China versus those that occurred in Egypt 
during the specified timeframe. Chinese incidents examined here occurred independently 
of one another. Further, there was with no evidence of any substantial network 
transference or network overlap between these specified incidents. In the Egyptian 
incidents examined, the opposite appears to be true. Despite some questionable capacity 
to affect street organizing, each Egyptian incident held singular importance for its 
behind-the-scenes ability to incrementally strengthen its respective network. By 2010, 
this resulted in strengthened collective action that was gradually cultivated over the 
course of time and witnessed in the two previous incidents. With this in mind, it should 
be noted that the networks formed in conjunction with these three Egyptian cases set the 
stage for the networks underlying the 2011 uprisings. 
The ruling parties’ seizure of their respective press systems presents an obvious 
barrier to citizens gaining objective political information. Thus, this research also reflects 
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how citizens in authoritarian regimes adapt aspects of the public sphere to the resources 
available to them within their existing political environments. Despite the absence of 
democratic structure and agency, citizens in both the Chinese and Egyptian incidents 
maximize the utility of the Web’s immediacy and reach to create an alternate space where 
some freer dialogue may take place. 
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